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Seven years ago, Chief Judge Jon O. Newman highlighted the “inevitable
tension” in securities class actions:
On the one hand, there is the interest in deterring fraud in the securities markets and
remedying it when it occurs.  That interest is served by recognizing that the victims of
fraud often are unable to detail their allegations until they have had some opportunity
to conduct discovery of those reasonably suspected of having perpetrated a fraud . . . .
On the other hand, there is the interest in deterring the use of the litigation process as
a device for extracting undeserved settlements as the price of avoiding the extensive
discovery costs that frequently ensue once a complaint survives dismissal, even though
no recovery would occur if the suit were litigated to completion.1
Judge Newman also recognized that notice pleading rules then in force favored
the first of these interests.  He held that complaints alleging securities fraud
should not be dismissed—and plaintiffs thus should not be precluded from us-
ing the discovery process to search for evidence of fraud—“unless, in the fa-
miliar phrase from Conley v. Gibson, ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re-
lief.’”2
Two years later, Congress attempted to reverse the notice pleading system’s
pro-plaintiff bias by enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act3
(“PSLRA” or “Reform Act”) over President Clinton’s veto.  Congress took this
step after finding that (1) securities class actions generally were initiated and
controlled by plaintiffs’ attorneys; (2) those attorneys routinely filed class ac-
tions alleging securities fraud “without regard to any underlying culpability of
the issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead even-
tually to some plausible cause of action”; and (3) plaintiffs’ attorneys’ “abuse of
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1. In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993).
2. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Reform Act or PSLRA].
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the discovery process to impose [burdensome] costs” on defendants often led
“the victimized part[ies] to settle” claims that had no merit.4  Congress observed
that “investors always are the ultimate losers when extortionate ‘settlements’
are extracted from issuers,”5 and that “the reluctance of many judges to impose
sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, except in those cases in-
volving truly outrageous misconduct,” exacerbated the problems posed by abu-
sive securities class actions.6
The Reform Act’s legislative history contains no explicit discussion of either
Conley v. Gibson or the notice pleading philosophy that has governed civil ac-
tions in federal courts since 1938.  The pleading and discovery requirements
promulgated in the Reform Act cannot be reconciled with Conley v. Gibson;
they clearly reflect congressional rejection of the philosophy of notice pleading
in private securities fraud litigation.  Section 21D(b)(1) requires every plaintiff
alleging securities fraud to identify in her complaint each allegedly misleading
statement, to “specify . . . the reason or reasons why the statement [was] mis-
leading,”7 and, with respect to every allegation made on information and belief,
to “state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”8  Section
21D(b)(2) requires every plaintiff, with respect to each statement or omission
alleged to constitute a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5, to “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
[scienter].”9  Section 21D(b)(3)(A) directs courts to dismiss any complaint that
does not meet the requirements of sections (b)(1) and (b)(2).10  Section
21D(b)(3)(B) effectively precludes a plaintiff from relying on the discovery
process to uncover evidence of fraud by directing courts to stay all discovery
“during the pendency of any motion to dismiss.”11  Viewed as a whole, these
provisions reflect an effort by Congress to reverse the litigation dynamic de-
scribed by Judge Newman.12  They preclude a plaintiff from “conduct[ing] dis-
covery of those [she] reasonably suspect[s] of having perpetrated a fraud”13 un-
4. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
5. Id. at 32.
6. Id. at 31.
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).  This
portion of section (b)(1) essentially duplicates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s requirement that
a plaintiff plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. Id. § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).  The statute uses the term “the re-
quired state of mind,” but, in the case of an action brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the re-
quired state of mind is “scienter.”  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
10. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV
1998).
11. Id. § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).  The discovery stay provision provides for an
exception if “the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to
preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.”  Id.  Apart from this exception, dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 233-237, courts uniformly have interpreted section
21D(b)(3)(B) to preclude a plaintiff from conducting discovery prior to the time a motion to dismiss is
filed.  See id.
12. See supra text accompanying note 1.
13. In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993).
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less she first is able to file a complaint, without the benefits of discovery, that
satisfies the stringent pleading requirements set forth in sections (b)(1) and
(b)(2).
Most commentary to date has focused on two questions relating to those re-
quirements: (1) Are facts that suggest a defendant acted recklessly sufficient to
create a strong inference of scienter? (2) Are facts that suggest a defendant had
a motive and the opportunity to engage in securities fraud, standing alone, suf-
ficient to create a strong inference of scienter?14
This article focuses on other issues, dealing primarily with what I call the
“Basis Requirement”—the statement in section (b)(1) that with respect to
every allegation made on information and belief, a plaintiff must “state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”  In addition, this article
addresses how the Basis Requirement relates to the “Strong Inference Re-
quirement” set forth in section (b)(2) and what it means to create a strong in-
ference of scienter.15
Issues associated with the Basis Requirement and its relationship to the
Strong Inference Requirement are far more significant than the issues con-
cerning degrees of recklessness and motive and opportunity that have preoccu-
pied commentators to date.16  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation17 illustrates this point.  The panel there di-
vided, 2-1, on two questions.  The first concerned how to define when reckless-
ness constitutes scienter.  The majority held that a plaintiff must plead facts suf-
ficient to give rise to a strong inference that a defendant acted with “deliberate
14. See, e.g., Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Pleading Scienter Under the PSLRA, N.Y. L.J., July 22, 1999, at
5 (Mr. Giuffra is identified as “a principal drafter of the PSLRA”); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Sili-
con Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773 (2000); Matthew Roskoski, Note, A
Case-By-Case Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2265 (1999).  The principal prior exception to this trend is Miranda S. Schiller & Ha-
ron W. Murage, Information and Belief Pleading Under the Reform Act, 8 SEC. REFORM ACT LITIG.
REP. 8 (Oct. 1999); see also Symposium: Securities Fraud Litigation After Silicon Graphics, 7 SEC.
REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. 798, 807-11 (Aug.-Sept. 1999) (discussing the Basis Requirement, including
remark of Bruce G. Vanyo, Esq., counsel for defendants in Silicon Graphics, to the effect that the
court’s ruling on that requirement “is the more significant part” of its decision).
15. See supra text accompanying note 8.
16. I exclude from this list the question of whether the PSLRA should be interpreted to preclude
liability based on recklessness in all suits brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  As a number of
courts have held, the language of the PSLRA clearly is directed at establishing a pleading standard, not
changing the substantive definition of “scienter.”  Thus, the question of whether recklessness can con-
stitute scienter remains unresolved at the Supreme Court level.  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).  However, it has always seemed clear to me that the PSLRA could not rea-
sonably be interpreted to abolish liability for reckless conduct.  See Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser,
Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457, 466 n.47 (1998).  In fact, Congress’s adoption of an actual intent
standard in certain circumstances, see, e.g., § 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78u-5 (Supp. IV 1998), can be read as an implicit congressional endorsement of the uniform holdings of
the courts of appeals that a high degree of recklessness qualifies as scienter.  See Greebel v. FTP Soft-
ware, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 200-01 (1st Cir. 1999).
17. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
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recklessness,”18 while Judge Browning argued in dissent that facts sufficient to
support a strong inference of simple recklessness should suffice.19
The dispositive question, however, concerned the proper interpretation of
the Basis Requirement.  Central to the plaintiffs’ claim were allegations that
certain internal reports, including an alleged “Stop Ship” report, had placed the
senior management of Silicon Graphics, Inc. (“SGI”) on notice of problems
that SGI was experiencing with the Toshiba ASIC chip—a primary component
of the “Indigo2 Impact Workstation” that SGI had claimed it was about to
bring to market.  The court held that in the absence of specifics such as the
dates of the alleged reports and the names of the authors and addressees, it
would not credit those allegations because it could not determine whether
plaintiffs’ claim that SGI knew its statements about the Indigo2 were false re-
flected anything more than their speculative belief that a fraud must have oc-
curred.20  Judge Browning disagreed, arguing that “precise details” of the kind
demanded by the majority were “neither expected nor required at the pleading
stage of the proceedings.”21  Moreover, Judge Browning pointed out, if the court
treated as true plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the Stop Ship and other inter-
nal reports,22 those allegations clearly were sufficient to “form the basis for a
strong inference that SGI’s officers knew the representations they were making
to the public were false when made.”23
Note the import of the last quoted statement.  It was the majority’s conclu-
sion that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the Basis Requirement that determined
the outcome in Silicon Graphics, not its conclusion regarding “deliberate reck-
lessness.”  Put differently, had the majority agreed with Judge Browning that
plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the Stop Ship report should be treated as true
for the purpose of deciding defendants’ motion to dismiss, the majority would
have had no choice but to agree with Judge Browning that plaintiffs had pled
facts sufficient to support a strong inference that SGI had made public state-
ments with actual knowledge that those statements were false.  That, in turn,
would have rendered irrelevant the debate between the majority and Judge
Browning over whether simple recklessness or “deliberate recklessness” is the
equivalent of scienter.24
18. See id. at 974-79.
19. See id. at 991-96 (Browning, J., dissenting).
20. See id. at 984-85.
21. Id. at 999 (Browning, J., dissenting).
22. As would be the case under Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
23. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 999-1001 (Browning, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
24. In fact, given the majority’s holding that plaintiff had not met the Basis Requirement, its hold-
ing concerning “deliberate recklessness” could be considered dicta.
It is useful, in this regard, to consider the finding of Professors Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard that
there was a statistically significant, positive stock market reaction to SGI.  See Johnson et al., supra
note 14. The authors attribute the reaction to the court’s holding that the Reform Act requires evi-
dence of deliberate recklessness.  It seems equally plausible that the market was reacting to the court’s
insistence that plaintiffs plead the basis for claims made on information and belief.
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The Silicon Graphics court’s interpretation of the Basis Requirement, in my
view, is correct and, more important, is critical to implementing Congress’s pur-
pose in enacting the pleading and discovery stay provisions of the Reform Act.
Part II of this article explains further why I believe this to be so.  Part III com-
ments briefly on the holding in Silicon Graphics concerning “deliberate reck-
lessness” and argues that it does not differ significantly from the scienter stan-
dards most other Courts of Appeals have adopted. Part IV describes and
analyzes the portions of the First Circuit’s decision in Greebel v. FTP Software,
Inc.,25 that interpret the Basis Requirement and analyze its relationship to the
Strong Inference Requirement.26  Part V discusses cases pending in the Second
and Third Circuits that raise important interpretative issues relating to sections
(b)(1) and (b)(2).  How those courts resolve those issues will provide important
clues as to whether the lower federal courts will follow a unified or a frag-
mented approach to interpreting the Reform Act’s pleading requirements.  Part
VI, the conclusion, highlights the policy consequences of the approach to inter-
preting sections (b)(1) and (b)(2) that this article argues courts should adopt
and outlines alternative strategies courts could pursue.
II
WHY THE BASIS REQUIREMENT IS CRITICAL
To appreciate the critical importance of the Basis Requirement, one first
must understand the fundamental pleading problem faced by an investor who
suspects or believes she is the victim of a disclosure fraud.27  An issuer will have
disclosed some unexpected bad news, such as a decline in sales and earnings, a
problem in bringing a product to market, or a discovery of fraudulent practices
at a division or subsidiary.  The issuer’s announcement will have precipitated a
sharp decline in the price of its stock.28  In virtually every such situation, the is-
suer also will have issued “earlier, cheerier”29 statements relating to the subject
discussed in the “bad news” release.  Without conducting a costly investigation
or obtaining access to the issuer’s files and personnel, however, the investor and
her attorney will find it difficult to ascertain whether the issuer just became
aware of the bad news or whether it knew or suspected the bad news at the time
the issuer made the “earlier, cheerier” statements.
25. 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
26. In an earlier article, I suggested that the First Circuit’s pre-Reform Act jurisprudence con-
cerning pleading securities fraud could serve as a model for other circuits when applying the Reform
Act’s new pleading requirements.  See Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement:
Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 695-99 (1996).
27. I have previously discussed this issue.  See Weiss, supra note 26; Weiss & Moser, supra note 16.
Ongoing study has enhanced my understanding of the pleading issues involved in securities fraud litiga-
tion and has led me to modify (or, more charitably, to improve and refine) my thinking about these is-
sues.
28. Although a few such cases involve claims relating to positive corporate developments, see, e.g.,
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the vast majority involve claims that corporations have
misrepresented or failed to disclose bad news.
29. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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The investor’s attorney, if she is experienced, will be acutely aware that a
complaint alleging simply that the issuer “must have known” the bad news at
the time it made the “earlier, cheerier” statements will be dismissed on the
ground that it impermissibly pleads no more than “fraud by hindsight.”30  But if
the investor’s attorney is skilled as well as experienced, she can draw with rela-
tive ease on the information in the bad news release and other publicly avail-
able information to draft a complaint alleging that, at the time the issuer made
the “earlier, cheerier” statements, either the issuer and its senior managers had
learned from internal reports the negative information later disclosed in the
“bad news” release or that “red flags” had placed the issuer and its senior man-
agers on notice that those negative developments were highly likely to occur.
Finally, the investor’s attorney will know that if the court can be persuaded to
treat those allegations as true, they also will support a strong inference that the
issuer and its senior managers made the “earlier, cheerier” statements either
with actual knowledge that they were false or in reckless disregard of that pos-
sibility.31
The complaint in Silicon Graphics32 illustrates this genre of creative draft-
ing.33  In July 1995, SGI announced plans to produce the Indigo2, a new line of
graphic design computers that would compete with a line of Hewlett Packard
workstations.  SGI said that it expected to ship the Indigo2 in volume by Sep-
tember 30, 1995, and to ship an upgraded version of the Indigo2 by January 1,
30. The courts have uniformly rejected complaints that allege no more than “fraud by hindsight.”
See, e.g., Glenfed, 42 F.3d at 1549; Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1992);
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469-70 (2d
Cir. 1978).
31. In my experience, persons unfamiliar with securities fraud litigation often find it difficult to ap-
preciate the relative ease with which a skilled and experienced plaintiffs’ attorney can draft such a
seemingly particularized complaint.  Consequently, in the Appendix, I set forth three illustrative exam-
ples, two based in pre-PSLRA Ninth Circuit decisions holding that such complaints should not be dis-
missed and one based on a post-PSLRA decision dismissing such a complaint.
An article in Fortune illustrates how the most prominent plaintiffs’ firm specializing in prosecuting
securities class actions has used such complaints to secure lucrative settlements:
Bill Lerach is explaining what he needs to file one of his infamous shareholder class-action
lawsuits: “Stock drops. Insiders trading. A revelation of bad news. You’re not going to have
that and come up dry.  It’s not going to happen.” . . . His rationale is that his long experience
has given him an unerring instinct for corporate wrongdoing.  “It’s almost like having X-ray
vision,” he boasts.  “I’m almost always right.  I’m seldom wrong.”  Then, once Lerach is al-
lowed to begin discovery—and search for damning internal documents—well, at that point,
the game is pretty much over.  “You can always find a document to incriminate them,” he
says.
Peter Elkind, The King of Pain is Hurting, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2000, at 190.
My awareness of these and similar practices has made me unsympathetic to arguments in favor of
allowing plaintiffs to prosecute “long shot” securities claims.  See Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous
Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567 (2000).
32. The discussion that follows relates to the First Amended Consolidated Complaint, In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C96-0393FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16989 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996)
[hereinafter SGI FAC] (visited Feb. 27, 2001) <http://securities.stanford.edu/com
plaints/sgi/96cv00393/068.html>.
33. The complaint was drafted by the San Diego office of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,
LLP, which ranks among the most skilled and experienced offices of plaintiffs’ attorneys in the United
States.
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1996.  SGI also claimed that the Indigo2 would help the company sustain a forty
percent growth rate.34  Within a few weeks of that announcement, SGI stock
reached an all-time high.35
Throughout the remainder of 1995, SGI continued to issue positive state-
ments regarding the Indigo2 and denied negative rumors about its perform-
ance.36  Then, on January 2, 1996, SGI unexpectedly announced “disappointing
second quarter results and acknowledged that revenue growth for the year
would be much lower than expected.”37  SGI senior management admitted to
securities analysts on January 17, 1996 “that SGI had been unable to fill Indigo2
orders because of a shortage of [Toshiba] ASIC chips and other primary com-
ponents.”38  As might be expected, SGI’s stock price declined following these
announcements.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys, in addition to learning of these problems in January
1996, either learned from current or former SGI employees or simply assumed
that SGI, like most major corporations, had an elaborate management informa-
tion system that generated reports about major operational problems as soon as
they occurred.  Drawing on that information (or that combination of informa-
tion and assumptions), they drafted a complaint alleging securities fraud.  The
key assertion was that SGI’s senior management knew, not later than mid-
September 1995, that SGI was experiencing problems with the Toshiba ASIC
chip, a primary component of the Indigo2, which made it impossible for SGI to
implement the Indigo2 program on the schedule it had announced.  Plaintiffs
alleged that as a consequence, all the positive statements SGI and its senior
managers made about the Indigo2 program from mid-September until the end
of November 1995 were false and were made with actual knowledge that they
were false.
More specifically, the key portions of plaintiffs’ First Amended Consoli-
dated Complaint assert:
34. [S]GI’s management information system was capable of generating reports on
a daily basis showing orders received (by product), shipments (by product), invento-
ries (by product), as well as overall corporate revenue, cash balances, inventories, etc.
As a result of this system, SGI’s top managers, such as [CEO Edward R.] McCracken,
[Sr. V.P. Forest] Baskett, [Sr. V.P. Robert K.] Burgess, [Sr. V.P. Michael] Ramsey,
[Sr. V.P. William M.] Kelly and [Sr. V.P. Teruyasu] Sekimoto, were aware of the cor-
poration’s performance on a daily basis and were thus aware, virtually immediately, of
any significant problems with orders, product production, shipment delays or invento-
ries, etc.
. . . .
37. When SGI encountered serious quality and performance problems with the
Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstations due to the ASIC chip performance problems as it
attempted to assemble and ship the Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstations in volume in
34. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 981-82.
37. Id. at 982.
38. Id.
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Sept. 1995, SGI’s internal corporate procedures required that the managers of the In-
digo2 IMPACTTM project immediately advise top management of this problem in mid-
Sept. 1995 via a “Stop Ship” report.  Such a report was issued and contained the fol-
lowing: (1) identified the problem; (2) notified top management of the impact on vol-
ume shipments and revenue; and (3) requested input on satisfying customer demands
in light of the available volume.  Subsequently, within three weeks the marketing, en-
gineering and manufacturing managers prepared a report with the Indigo2 IMPACTTM
Program Director detailing the nature of the problem, its cause, revenue impact, how
the problem would be solved, how long the solution would take, and what impact the
problem and the solution would have on that project’s ability to meet its previously
forecasted or budgeted sales.
38. Thus, when the serious deficiencies with the ASIC chips being used in the In-
digo2 IMPACTTM Workstations were discovered in mid-Sept. 1995, McCracken,
Baskett, Burgess, Kelly, Ramsey and Sekimoto were immediately advised of the
problems by the Indigo2 IMPACTTM project managers . . . . After they were advised of
this problem in late Sept. 1995 by the Indigo2 IMPACTTM project team, there immedi-
ately occurred a series of meetings among these top managers, including the Individ-
ual Defendants, to evaluate the seriousness of the problem, what could be done to at-
tempt to fix it, as well as which customer orders would be filled and to what extent.
At this time, in what was known inside SGI as the “conspiracy of silence,” the top of-
ficers of SGI, including the Individual Defendants, agreed that in order to conceal the
problem from the marketplace—disclosure of which would result in severely negative
impact on sales of the Indigo2 IMPACTTM products, a further loss of SGI’s competi-
tive position to Hewlett Packard and the collapse of SGI’s stock—that the problems
with the ASIC chips would be kept secret and that SGI would falsely tell it [sic] cus-
tomers, the marketplace and securities analysts that it had achieved “volume” ship-
ments of the Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstations, that it was not encountering any pro-
duction or component part problems with the product and that the reason customers
were not receiving the full amounts of Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstations ordered was
the extraordinary demand for the product which SGI simply could not meet.
39. Internally at SGI, the problems with Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstation produc-
tion due to ASIC chip yield problems from Toshiba continued to be encountered
throughout Oct. 1995, and were so serious that shipments of the Indigo2 IMPACTTM
Workstations remained well below the levels previously forecast . . . . This information
was provided to each of the defendants in the Oct. 1995 “Flash” financial report . . .
distributed to them no later than Nov. 3 or 6 . . . .
40. Internally at SGI, the problems with Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstation produc-
tion due to ASIC chip yield problems continued to be encountered throughout Nov.
1995.  The problems with ramping up of manufacturing of the R10000 ASIC chip also
continued and SGI knew that there was no possibility of shipping its upgraded,
high-end Indigo2 IMPACT Workstations in the volume necessary to achieve an-
nounced goals in the third quarter of FY96 . . . . This information was provided to
each of the defendants in the Nov. 1995 “Flash” financial report . . . distributed to
them no later than Dec. 4 or 5 . . . .
41. Because of the foregoing, each of the Individual Defendants was aware of
SGI’s FY96 forecast and budget and of the internal reports detailing the ASIC chip
problems (Stop Ship and Recovery Report), and the financial reports comparing
SGI’s actual results to those budgeted and/or forecasted.  Based on the negative in-
ternal reports specified earlier about the Indigo2 IMPACTTM Workstation and reports
of the Company’s actual performance compared to that budgeted and forecasted, the
Individual Defendants each knew SGI’s business was not performing as well as pub-
licly represented, that SGI was plagued by an inability to ship necessary volume due
to an inadequate supply of suitable ASIC chips from Toshiba, that problems with
ramping up manufacturing with the R10000 would impact future volume, that serious
and persistent problems with SGI’s North American direct sales force were resulting
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in reduced productivity, i.e., revenue shortfalls, weak OEM sales and weak sales in
Germany and France, and thus, SGI could not possibly achieve near to 40% growth in
the second quarter of FY96 or FY96 as a whole.  Thus, defendants each actually knew
that the forward-looking public statements issued during the Class Period about SGI
were false and misleading when made and actually knew or recklessly disregarded that
the non-forward-looking statements issued during the Class Period about SGI were
false and misleading when made.39
Plaintiffs said they based these allegations “upon the investigation of their
counsel, which included a review of SGI’s SEC filings, securities analysts re-
ports and advisories about the Company, press releases issued by the Company,
media reports about the Company and discussions with consultants . . . .”40
Plaintiffs added that they believed “that substantial evidentiary support will ex-
ist for the[se] allegations . . . after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.”41
The Silicon Graphics complaint undoubtedly was drafted with great care.
At first glance, it appears to set forth a detailed claim that SGI knew in Sep-
tember 1995 about problems with the Indigo2 program and the ASIC chip but
did not disclose those problems until January 1996.  Close analysis, however,
makes clear that plaintiffs’ allegations represent no more than a skillfully dis-
guised claim of “fraud by hindsight”—a claim that, in September 1995, SGI
must have been aware of the problems it disclosed in January 1996.
For example, the first clause of the first sentence of paragraph 37 makes
what appears to be an unqualified statement of historic fact—that “SGI en-
countered serious quality and performance problems with the Indigo2 . . . due
to the ASIC chip performance problems . . . in Sept. 1995.”  Nowhere in para-
graph 37, however, (or anywhere else in the complaint) do plaintiffs provide
any corroborating detailsapart from the information SGI disclosed in January
1996to support this conclusory assertion.  Plaintiffs might contend that the
second and third sentences of paragraph 37, which describe an alleged Stop
Ship report and an alleged report to the Indigo2 project manager, should be
construed as providing adequate corroboration for the assertion made in the
first sentence.  But while those sentences purport to describe the content of the
alleged reports, they do so in general terms and neither quote from the alleged
reports nor provide any indication of plaintiffs’ basis for their claim that such
reports were issued.  Rather, plaintiffs simply pile additional assertions—that
the reports describing the problems with the ASIC chip were issued—on top of
their initial assertion that SGI was aware of those problems in September 1995.
In paragraph 38, plaintiffs make additional allegations that build on these
assertions: (1) McCracken and the other individual defendants were immedi-
ately advised of the alleged problems with the ASIC chip; (2) those defendants
held a series of meetings to discuss those problems and entered into a “conspir-
acy of silence” to conceal those problems from the marketplace; and (3) those
defendants agreed to falsely represent to customers and analysts that SGI had
39. SGI FAC, supra note 32, ¶¶ 34, 37-41 (emphasis added).
40. Id. ¶ 96.
41. Id.
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achieved volume production of the Indigo2.  Based on the information plaintiffs
included in their complaint, it is impossible to determine whether plaintiffs had
any factual basis for these claims or whether they simply were speculating that,
given SGI’s disclosure in January 1996 that it had experienced problems with
the Indigo2 program and the ASIC chip, this probably is what occurred.
Paragraphs 39 and 40 are more of the same.  As for paragraph 41, plaintiffs
simply set forth the conclusions that would follow logically from the four para-
graphs that precede it if but only if one accepts as true the allegations in para-
graphs 37-40.  That is, if SGI began to experience problems with the ASIC chip
in September 1995, if the Stop Ship and program manager’s reports were issued
and brought those problems to the attention of SGI’s senior managers, if those
managers thereafter conspired to keep the problems with the ASIC chip secret
and to misrepresent the Indigo2 program to SGI’s customers and to securities
analysts, and if those managers continued to misrepresent material information
about the ASIC chip and the Indigo2 program during October and November
1995, then it would follow that SGI and the individual defendants had actual
knowledge that both the forward-looking and the non-forward-looking state-
ments that SGI and the individual defendants made about the Indigo2 program
between mid-September and the end of November 1995 were false at the time
they were made.42
As noted above, Judge Browning took the position that plaintiffs alleged the
“facts” set forth in paragraphs 37-41 with sufficient particularity to meet the re-
quirements of sections (b)(1) and (b)(2).43  Had the majority agreed with him,
the court would have left open the door44 to claims of “fraud by hindsight” mas-
querading as claims of disclosure fraud.45  The complaint in Silicon Graphics
would then have provided plaintiffs’ attorneys with a template for the conver-
sion of  hindsight suspicions of fraud into what, at least in the Ninth Circuit,
would be an adequately particularized claim of securities fraud.46
42. But if SGI did not become aware of the nature and magnitude of the problems with the ASIC
chip until shortly before its January 1996 announcements, this entire house of cards collapses.
43. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 997-1001 (9th Cir. 1999) (Browning, J.,
dissenting); supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
44. I say “left open the door” because two pre-Reform Act Ninth Circuit decisions, Fecht v. Price
Co., 70 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995), and Cooper v. Pickett, 122 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997), held that com-
plaints based on unsupported allegations similar to those made by plaintiffs in Silicon Graphics satis-
fied the particularity requirement of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b).  Ihave previously argued
that those cases were wrongly decided.  See Weiss & Moser, supra note 16, at 469 & n.63.  Yourish v.
California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992-98 (9th Cir. 1999), a post-Reform Act case that was decided af-
ter (but does not cite) Silicon Graphics appears to reverse Fecht and Cooper’s interpretation of Rule
9(b) without explicitly stating that it is doing so.
45. These were just the kind of speculative claims Congress sought to discourage when it passed
the Reform Act.  See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
46. The approach to pleading fraud followed by plaintiffs’ attorneys in Silicon Graphics is also
economically attractive in that it allows those attorneys to draft  complaints on the basis of readily
available information.  See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Ac-
tions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).  In this regard, it is notable that the Silicon Graphics plaintiffs’
description of the basis for their allegations includes no mention of interviews with current or former
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A majority of the court, however, rejected Judge Browning’s argument and
held that the complaint “neither states facts with sufficient particularity nor
raises a strong inference of deliberate recklessness.”47  More specifically, the
court refused to credit plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the alleged internal re-
ports and the alleged “conspiracy of silence” because the “complaint does not
include adequate corroborating details.”48  The court continued:
[Plaintiff] does not mention, for instance, the sources of her information with respect
to the reports, how she learned of the reports, who drafted them, or which officers re-
ceived them.  Nor does she include an adequate description of their contents which we
believe—if they did exist—would include countless specifics regarding ASIC chip
shortages, volume shortages, negative financial projections, and so on.  We would ex-
pect that a proper complaint which purports to rely on the existence of internal re-
ports would contain at least some specifics from those reports as well as such facts as
may indicate their reliability.49
Then the court made the following critical observation:
In the absence of such specifics, we cannot ascertain whether there is any basis for the
allegations that the officers had actual or constructive knowledge of SGI’s problems
that would cause their optimistic representations to the contrary to be consciously
misleading.  In other words, in the absence of such specifics, we cannot determine
whether there is any basis for alleging that the officers knew that their statements
were false at the time they were made—a required element in pleading fraud.  [Plain-
tiff] would have us speculate as to the basis for the allegations about the reports, the
severity of the problems, and the knowledge of the officers.  We decline to do so.
[Plaintiff] is required to state facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate reck-
lessness or intent.  It is not enough for her to state facts giving rise to a mere specula-
tive inference of deliberate recklessness, or even a reasonable inference of deliberate
recklessness.50
The court’s reasoning is sound.  Allegations of securities fraud must be
based on testimonial or documentary sources.  Where the source is a document
that the plaintiff possesses or has seen, one would, as the court in Silicon
Graphics suggests, expect the plaintiff to quote the relevant portions of that
document in the complaint.51  If the plaintiff purports to do so, the court should
treat those allegations as adequately corroborated for two reasons:  First, sec-
tion (b)(1) requires a plaintiff to plead only “facts,” not evidence; and second,
the plaintiff and her attorney probably would violate Rule 11(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Proceure and would run the risk of incurring substantial sanctions
SGI employees or other similar investigatory activity.  See supra text accompanying notes 39-41 (dis-
cussing SGI FAC).
47. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984.
48. Id. at 985.  Although the complaint before the court was filed on behalf of several named plain-
tiffs, see SGI FAC, supra note 32, ¶ 25, the court discussed it as if it had been filed only by Deanna
Brody, who filed the first complaint against SGI.  See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979-91.
49. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 985.
50. Id. (citation omitted).  The court relied on an amalgam of sections (b)(1) and (b)(2).  The last
quoted statement suggests that the complaint should be dismissed because it fails to give rise to a strong
inference of scienter, but the reason the complaint fails to do so lies in plaintiffs’ failure to meet the Ba-
sis Requirement.
51. See, e.g., Ruskin v. TIG Holdings, Inc., No. CIV. 1068(LLS), 2000 WL 1154278, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (citing plaintiffs’ quotation of memoranda prepared by officers of defendant
corporation).
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were they, without qualification, to purport to quote in a securities fraud com-
plaint a document that they did not possess and had never seen.52
Consider, next, a complaint that does not include direct quotations from a
purported document.  In the absence of such quotations, a court reasonably can
assume that the plaintiff does not possess and has not seen the alleged docu-
ment.  That, of course, does not mean the document does not exist.  The plain-
tiff may have learned of the document and its contents from a person who rep-
resented that she had seen the document or had learned of its contents from
another.53  If that is the case, Silicon Graphics holds that the plaintiff must set
forth specifics sufficient to allow the court to assess the credibility of her allega-
tions.54
The same is true with respect to allegations concerning oral statements pur-
portedly made to or by named individuals.  If the court is to assess whether the
plaintiff has a reasonable basis for each such allegation, and whether that alle-
gation, in combination with the plaintiff’s other allegations, gives rise to a
strong inference that a defendant acted with scienter, the plaintiff must tell the
court how she learned of those oral statements, from whom, and how her
sources learned of those statements (for example, whether the source heard the
alleged statement personally or was told by some third person that the state-
ment was made).
In short, Silicon Graphics reflects the Ninth Circuit’s appreciation of the ne-
cessity of requiring plaintiffs to disclose corroborating details so that a court can
distinguish an arguably meritorious claim of fraud from a cleverly disguised al-
legation of “fraud by hindsight.”55  Relying on the Basis Requirement, the court
correctly held that a complaint that includes no such details must be dismissed.56
52. Under Reform Act § 21D(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (Supp. IV 1998), a plaintiff and her attorney
who quoted a non-existent document in a complaint, in violation of Rule 11(b), could be held liable for
all of the defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses.
53. Such a third party may, in turn, claim to have seen the document or to have been told of its
contents by another.
54. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 985.
55. The court also seemed to appreciate that this problem is pervasive, noting that the district court
had taken “judicial notice of five securities class action complaints filed in United States District Courts
that contain the same boilerplate allegations of ‘negative internal reports’ . . . .” Id. at 984 n.14; see also
In re The Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (remarking that the Ba-
sis Requirement “is the PSLRA’s single most important weapon against pleading fraud by hindsight
because it forces plaintiffs to reveal whether they base their allegations on an inference of earlier
knowledge drawn from later disclosures or from contemporaneous documents or other facts”).
56. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984; see also Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189
F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (relying on Silicon Graphics’s interpretation of the Basis Requirement to
grant defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to a complaint that the trial court,
in a pre-Silicon Graphics decision, had refused to dismiss).
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III
DEFINING “THE REQUIRED STATE OF MIND”
As noted in Section I, the focus of this article is not on the question of what
degree of recklessness constitutes scienter57 or whether evidence of motive and
opportunity, standing alone, is sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter.
However, courts’ holdings on those issues provide the substantive context to
which the Basis Requirement relates.  Those holdings also are relevant to the
question of when a plaintiff’s allegations should be deemed to give rise to a
strong inference of scienter.
Six Courts of Appeals have addressed those questions.58  Only one, the
Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics, has held that, at a minimum, a plaintiff must
plead facts sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of “deliberate or con-
scious recklessness”59 and that evidence of motive and opportunity, standing
alone, never is sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter.60  This section
argues that Silicon Graphics’s holdings on these issues do not differ significantly
from the holdings of the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits in Greebel, Com-
share, and Avado, respectively.  Section V discusses the Second and Third Cir-
cuits’ holdings on these issues.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder61 establishes the framework for discussion of
what constitutes “the required state of mind” in actions under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.  The Court interpreted section 10(b) to require proof of “scienter,”
which it defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud.”62  The Court also reserved the question of “whether, in certain cir-
cumstances, reckless behavior” is the equivalent of scienter,63 and it has twice
subsequently reserved that question.64
Every Court of Appeals to address the issue has held that proof of reckless-
ness can suffice.65  The Courts of Appeals also uniformly have adopted what is
often referred to as the Sundstrand definition of recklessness:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
57. Section (b)(2) requires a plaintiff in a private action for money damages to “state with particu-
larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
58. The six decisions, all of which consider these issues in relation to actions under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, are Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180
F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig. 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271
(11th Cir. 1999); and Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
59. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
60. See id.
61. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
62. See id. at 193 & n.12.
63. Id.
64. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.4 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 686 n.5 (1980).
65. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases from
11 circuits).
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standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.66
Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, though, courts rarely referred to Sund-
strand when considering motions to dismiss.67  In some circuits, including the
Ninth, the issue did not arise because plaintiffs were allowed to plead state of
mind generally, so long as they pled with particularity the circumstances consti-
tuting the alleged fraud.68  In other circuits, the situation was different.  In the
Second Circuit—on whose case law the language of section (b)(2) is based—
plaintiffs alleging securities fraud were required to plead facts that “give rise to
a ‘strong inference’ that the defendants possessed the requisite fraudulent in-
tent.”69  The Second Circuit, however, allowed plaintiffs to satisfy this require-
ment by alleging facts that either established that the defendants had a motive
and the opportunity to commit fraud or that constituted strong circumstantial
evidence of reckless or conscious misbehavior.70
Close examination of individual Second Circuit decisions makes clear that—
perhaps in deference to the statement in Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that state of mind can be alleged generally71—while the Second Cir-
cuit may have “talked the talk,” it did not consistently “walk the walk.”  That is,
in numerous cases the Second Circuit allowed plaintiffs to survive motions to
dismiss on the basis of allegations that by no stretch of the imagination gave rise
to a strong inference that the defendants had acted intentionally or with the de-
gree of recklessness required by Sundstrand.72
Time Warner provides a good illustration.  Plaintiffs argued that Time War-
ner had delayed disclosing its plan to raise needed capital through a rights of-
fering in the hope that the delay would allow the company to increase the price
66. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Franke
v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).  Sundstrand was the first
appellate decision to adopt this definition.  See id. at 1044-45.  The Seventh Circuit squared its holding
with Hochfelder by describing such recklessness as “the functional equivalent of intent.”  Id. at 1045.
The Ninth Circuit recently adopted the Sundstrand definition in Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569.  Other
Circuits also have adopted the standard.  See Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 1982);
SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d
929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692
(1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1978).
67. Sundstrand involved an appeal from a judgment entered after trial.  Hollinger, the case in
which the Ninth Circuit adopted the Sundstrand standard, involved an appeal of a decision granting a
motion for summary judgment.
68. See In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that a
plaintiff may aver scienter “simply by saying that scienter existed”).
69. Beck v. Mfrs Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987), first set forth this requirement.
70. See, e.g., In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993).
71. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (referring to Rule
9(b)’s relaxed specificity requirement for scienter).
72. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Baesa Sec. Litig.,
969 F. Supp. 238, 242 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (recognizing inconsistencies in the Second Circuit’s applica-
tion of its “strong inference” test); see also Roskoski, supra note 14, at 2273-74 (distinguishing between
the pleading “standard” used by the Second Circuit and the two “tests” that court employed to deter-
mine whether a plaintiff had met that standard).
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at which it could sell the stock for which the rights would be issued.  Defendants
ridiculed plaintiffs’ claim, pointing out that no matter when Time Warner an-
nounced the rights offering, SEC rules would require it to wait several weeks
before it could begin to sell stock.  During that period, investors surely would
incorporate all material information concerning the rights offering into their
valuation of Time Warner stock.  Consequently, defendants maintained, Time
Warner could not reasonably have expected to be able to realize any financial
benefit by delaying announcement of its decision to raise capital by means of a
rights offering. The Second Circuit acknowledged that defendants’ argument
had merit but nonetheless reversed the district court’s decision dismissing plain-
tiffs’ complaint.73  The appellate court observed that because “the laws of eco-
nomics have not yet achieved the status of the law of gravity, we cannot say, on
a motion to dismiss, that plaintiffs cannot prove that a motive existed.”74
Note the striking disparity between the language of Hochfelder, Sundstrand,
and the Second Circuit’s “strong inference” test on the one hand and the court’s
holding in Time Warner on the other.  Even one who agreed that, with all rea-
sonable inferences drawn in their favor, plaintiffs arguably had pled facts that
might suggest Time Warner hoped that delaying disclosure of its intent to make
the rights offering would provide it with some financial benefit still would be
forced to concede that the facts pled by plaintiffs were not sufficient to support
a strong inference that Time Warner was motivated by an intent to deceive or
defraud.75  In other words, the court allowed plaintiffs’ complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss because it contained a weak and implausible claim that Time
Warner may have hoped to realize some financial gain.
Silicon Graphics can best be understood as reflecting a rejection of decisions
such as Time Warner.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that section (b)(2) imposed
an obligation to give content to both Hochfelder and Sundstrand when deciding
motions to dismiss.  Hochfelder and Sundstrand make clear that recklessness is
the equivalent of scienter only when it “reflects some degree of intentional or
73. Judge Ralph Winter filed a spirited dissent supporting defendants’ claim.  See Time Warner, 9
F.3d at 272-75 (Winter, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
75. This is especially so because whether Time Warner had a duty to update its prior statements
concerning its plans to raise additional capital itself posed a close question.  See San Leandro Emer-
gency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 810 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Time
Warner went nearly to the outer limit of the line that separates disclosable plans from plans that need
not be disclosed . . . .”); Kalnit v. Eichler, 85 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that
complaint did not create a strong inference of scienter because facts defendants allegedly failed to dis-
close were, at best, of marginal materiality); Weiss, supra note 26, at 688-90 (arguing that whether an
issuer clearly has a duty to disclose facts is relevant to inference of scienter).
It also is clear that Time Warner’s actions did not involve an “extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care which presents a danger of misleading buyers and seller that is either known to the de-
fendant or is so obvious that [defendants] must have been aware of it.”  Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).  see Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 271 (explicitly holding that, with
respect to Time Warner’s alleged nondisclosure of the rights offering, “the complaint cannot be said to
adequately plead scienter under the circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless behavior ap-
proach”).
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conscious misconduct.”76  It follows, Silicon Graphics reasoned, that to meet the
requirements of section (b)(2), plaintiffs must plead with particularity facts that
“create a strong inference of, at a minimum, ‘deliberate recklessness.’”77  It also
“follows that plaintiffs proceeding under the PSLRA can no longer aver intent
in general terms of mere ‘motive and opportunity’ or ‘recklessness,’ but rather,
must state specific facts indicating no less than a degree of recklessness that
strongly suggests actual intent.”78
Comshare adopted a slightly different approach to interpreting section
(b)(2).  The Sixth Circuit, as did the Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics, first re-
viewed Hochfelder and its earlier endorsement of the Sunstrand definition of
recklessness.79  The court then held that “[b]ecause it is clear that recklessness,
understood as a mental state apart from negligence and akin to conscious disre-
gard, may constitute scienter, we conclude that under the PSLRA, a plaintiff
may survive a motion to dismiss by pleading facts that give rise to a ‘strong in-
ference’ of recklessness.”80  The Sixth Circuit did not use the term “deliberate
recklessness,” but its holding that a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to give
rise to a strong inference of recklessness “akin to conscious disregard,” in my
opinion, amounts to much the same thing.  It is hard to conceive of a set of facts
that the Sixth Circuit would view as sufficient to give rise to a strong inference
of recklessness “akin to conscious disregard” but that the Ninth Circuit would
hold was not sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of  “deliberate reckless-
ness.”
Comshare’s discussion of motive and opportunity also closely tracks Silicon
Graphics’s discussion of that issue:
[E]vidence of a defendant’s motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud does
not constitute “scienter” for the purposes of § 10b or Rule 10b-5 liability . . . . While
facts regarding motive and opportunity may be “relevant to pleading circumstances
from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred,” and may, on
occasion, rise to the level of creating a strong inference of reckless or knowing con-
duct, the bare pleading of motive and opportunity does not, standing alone, constitute
the pleading of a strong inference of scienter.81
At most, this statement reflects a scintilla of difference from Silicon Graphics.
Both courts held that facts suggesting motive and opportunity may provide cir-
cumstantial evidence of scienter.  Silicon Graphics apparently ruled out the pos-
sibility that such facts, standing alone, can ever give rise to a strong inference of
reckless or knowing misconduct, while Comshare suggested that, “on occasion,”
facts relating to motive and opportunity may support such an inference.
But such facts will rarely arise.  One conceivable example is a situation in
which (1) a corporation’s top executives held substantial amounts of stock; (2)
76. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 979.
79. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548-50 (6th Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 550.
81. Id. at 551 (citation omitted).
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those executives sold all or most of their stock shortly after the corporation dis-
closed “good news” about some aspect of its business; and (3) the corporation
shortly thereafter issued “bad news” about the same aspect of its business.  The
Sixth Circuit might well be prepared to treat these facts, which on their own
strongly suggest motive and opportunity, as sufficient to create a strong infer-
ence of scienter.  Silicon Graphics held that more is required.  However, relying
on the same facts, the Ninth Circuit might well treat the inconsistency between
the two statements, together with their temporal proximity, as circumstantial
evidence that the corporation knew or recklessly disregarded that the first
statement was false when it was made. Thus, it might well hold, as would the
Sixth Circuit, that these facts plus those suggesting motive and opportunity
were sufficient to support a strong inference of scienter.82
Greebel and Avado endorse Comshare’s interpretation of section (b)(2).83
Thus, despite minor semantic differences, the substantive definition of scienter
adopted by the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits appears to be essentially the
same as that adopted by the Ninth.
IV
GREEBEL GIVES CONTENT TO THE STRONG INFERENCE REQUIREMENT
Greebel is significant for two other reasons.  First, it interprets the Basis Re-
quirement in much the same fashion as does Silicon Graphics.  Second, it at-
tributes considerable importance to Congress’s use of the term “strong infer-
ence” in section (b)(2), which leads it to hold that adequately corroborated
allegations of fraud—which may well have survived a motion to dismiss in pre-
Reform Act days—were properly dismissed because they did not create a
strong inference of scienter.
Greebel has a somewhat unusual procedural history.  The district court de-
nied defendants’ initial motion to dismiss because the complaint included the
following “white out” allegation:
82. Note, too, that Comshare and Silicon Graphics adopt the same approach to evaluating claims
that sales by insiders support an inference of scienter.  Both place on plaintiffs the burden of pleading
facts that demonstrate not simply that insiders sold stock at prices influenced by the alleged fraud, but
that the insiders’ sales, viewed in context, were unusual and suspicious.  See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 553;
); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Among the relevant factors
to consider are: (1) the amount and percentage of shares sold by insiders; (2) the timing of the sales;
and (3) whether the sales were consistent with the insider’s prior trading history.”).
83. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Our view of [section
(b)(2)] is thus close to that articulated by the Sixth Circuit.”); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d
1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
[W]e are in basic agreement with the Sixth Circuit; we hold that the Reform Act does not pro-
hibit the practice of alleging scienter by pleading facts that denote severe recklessness, the
standard previously approved of by this Circuit . . . but we also hold that the Reform Act does
not codify the ‘motive and opportunity’ test formulated by the Second Circuit.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Greebel also takes essentially the same approach to allegations of insider trading.  See Greebel,
194 F.3d at 206-07.  Avado does not explicitly address insider trading.
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During the third quarter of 1995, the defendants became aware that sales were drasti-
cally below internal forecasts and performance goals and instructed FTP’s sales force
to induce distributors to accept additional FTP product with the promise that the dis-
tributors had the right to return any product that they failed to sell.  Distributors sent
in their orders to FTP noting that they were entitled to return any unsold product.
Aware that recognizing revenue where the right of return existed was improper, the
defendants instructed FTP’s sales force to “white out” this notation on the distribu-
tors’ order forms in order to prevent FTP’s auditors from discovering the contingent
nature of the sales.  A material percentage of these purported sales were either re-
turned to the Company or remain with distributors, but have not been paid for.84
Following the district court’s decision, defendants and plaintiffs made dis-
closures pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Defen-
dants demanded that plaintiffs produce documents or witnesses to support this
“white out” allegation.85  Plaintiffs countered by asking the court to allow them
to conduct discovery of FTP customers who they believed had submitted the
purchase orders on which notations of a right to return allegedly had been
“whited out.”86  The district court rejected plaintiffs’ request.  Although it had
allowed plaintiffs to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of their
uncorroborated “white out” allegations, the court now told plaintiffs: “You
have to know what your case is about before you bring it.”87  Because plaintiffs’
attorney indicated that the “white out” allegation may have been based entirely
on the hearsay testimony of one witness, the court ordered plaintiffs to advise
defendants of the name of that and any other percipient witnesses and the sub-
stance of their testimony.88  Plaintiffs thereafter acknowledged that the “white
out” allegation was based on the testimony of Trudy Nichols, a former FTP
employee who plaintiffs’ attorney advised the court had been told about the al-
leged “whiting out” by current FTP employees.89  Plaintiffs, however, were un-
able to produce Ms. Nichols for a deposition as she was either unavailable or
unwilling to testify.90
84. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint ¶ 45, Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 370 (D.
Mass. 1998), received as an attachment to a facsimile dated Aug. 2, 1999, from Sanford Dumain, Esq.,
counsel for plaintiffs, to Elliott Weiss, in which Mr. Dumain identified paragraph 45 as “the only spe-
cific reference to ‘white out’” in the Second Amended Complaint.  The district court did not issue an
opinion explaining its denial of defendants’ initial motion to dismiss.  At a subsequent hearing, the
court stated that it was the white out allegation “that saves [plaintiffs] from the Motion to Dismiss.”
Appellant’s Brief App., vol. 5, at 1190, Greebel (No. 98-2194) [hereinafter Greebel Appendix] (tran-
script of hearing, Apr. 29, 1997); see also Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 370, 373 (D. Mass.
1998).  At the hearing on defendants’ initial motion to dismiss, defendants’ counsel pressed the court to
dismiss the complaint on grounds other than plaintiffs’ failure to specify the basis for their “white out”
allegation.  See Greebel Appendix, supra, at 1147-49 (transcript of hearing, Feb. 4, 1997).
85. See Greebel Appendix, supra note 84, at 1187 (transcript of hearing, Apr. 29, 1997).
86. See id. at 1193-94.
87. Id. at 1191.  The court added: “I mean, filing a lawsuit should be the last thing you do, not the
first thing you do.”  Id.
88. See id. at 1196.  At a hearing held six weeks later, the court reiterated this instruction after
plaintiffs produced a list of seven witnesses, six of whom were defendants.  See id. at 1200 (transcript of
hearing, June 19, 1997).
89. See id. at 1210-11 (transcript of hearing, July 31, 1997).
90. See Greebel, 182 F.R.D. at 372.
WEISS_FMT.DOC 04/19/01  1:31 PM
Page 5: Spring/Summer 2001]PLEADING SECURITIES FRAUD 23
That led defendants to move for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs’
“white out” claim and to renew their motion to dismiss the balance of the com-
plaint.  The district court granted both motions91 and also denied plaintiffs’ re-
quest that it consider evidence plaintiffs had obtained from files FTP had dis-
closed, reasoning, in effect, that such evidence constituted fruit from a poisoned
tree.92  Plaintiffs appealed all three rulings to the First Circuit.
Greebel first held that the Basis Requirement in section (b)(1) “is congruent
and consistent with the pre-existing standards of this circuit.”93  The court noted,
in particular, that under Rule 9(b), “this court has required plaintiffs who bring
their claims on information and belief to ‘set forth the source of the information
and the reasons for the belief.’”94  These “strict pleading requirements under
Rule 9(b),” the court continued, “are, in our view, consistent with the
PSLRA.”95
Turning to section (b)(2), Greebel held that the language of the Act sup-
ports three conclusions.  First, “[C]ongress plainly contemplated that scienter
could be proven by inference, thus acknowledging the role of indirect and cir-
cumstantial evidence.”96  Second, “the words of the Act neither mandate nor
prohibit the use of any particular method to establish an inference of scienter.”97
Third, and most significantly, section (b)(2) effectively overrides Conley v. Gib-
son.  The court stated:
[C]ongress has effectively mandated a special standard for measuring whether allega-
tions of scienter survive a motion to dismiss. While under Rule 12(b)(6) all inferences
must be drawn in plaintiffs’ favor, inferences of scienter do not survive if they are
merely reasonable, as is true when pleadings for other causes of action are tested by
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  Rather, inferences of scienter survive a mo-
tion to dismiss only if they are both reasonable and “strong” inferences.98
The court then observed: “In the guise of tinkering with procedural require-
ments, Congress has effectively, for policy reasons, made it substantively harder
for plaintiffs to bring securities fraud cases, through the ‘strong inference’ of
91. See id. at 373, 376.  The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  See id. at 376.
92. See id. (“Plaintiffs would not have discovered the additional evidence but for the inclusion of
the white-out claim, which . . . has since turned out to be groundless.”).
93. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 193 (1st Cir. 1999).
94. Id. at 194 (quoting Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991)). The
court also quoted Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1985): “Even where allegations are
based on information and belief, supporting facts on which the belief is founded must be set forth in the
complaint.  And this holds true even when the fraud relates to matters peculiarly within the knowledge
of the opposing party.”  Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193.
95. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 194.  Two other circuits, in decisions involving claims of securities fraud
filed before the Reform Act became effective, also had interpreted Rule 9(b) to require plaintiffs to
specify the basis for allegations made on information and belief.  See Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122
F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Healthcare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 281-82 (7th Cir.
1996).
96. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195 (citation omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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scienter requirement.”99  Finally, the court reiterated: “The most salient feature
of the PSLRA is that whatever the characteristic pattern of the facts alleged,
those facts must now present a strong inference of scienter.  A mere reasonable
inference is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”100
Having established a framework for analysis, Greebel provided a concrete
example of the kind of allegations that may create a strong inference of scienter
when it stated that “[i]f adequately supported, claims that management deliber-
ately altered company records to hide material information from company audi-
tors could well create” a strong inference of scienter.101  In the case before it,
though, because “plaintiffs could not produce admissible evidence to support
the white-out allegations, [the court] disregard[ed them].”102
The terms the court used to state this holding raise an important question:
Did the court mean to suggest that only “admissible evidence” can constitute
“adequate support” for allegations of securities fraud?  In my view, that is not
how Greebel should be interpreted.  The question the court addressed was
whether the district court had properly granted defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment on the “white out” claim.  To survive that motion, plaintiffs
had to produce evidence that supported every essential element of the claim.
The court’s reference to “admissible evidence” thus makes sense in the context
of a motion for summary judgment, but it does not imply that a plaintiff must
support every essential allegation in her complaint with “admissible evidence.”
Greebel does make clear that the district court should have focused on
whether plaintiffs had described the source of information on which they based
their “white out” allegations when it ruled on defendants’ initial motion to dis-
miss.  Had the district court done so, it presumably would have granted defen-
dants’ motion because plaintiffs did not describe in their complaint the facts on
which those allegations were based.  Had plaintiffs then disclosed that the
“white out” allegations were based entirely on the hearsay statement of one
former FTP employee,103 Greebel establishes that the district court still should
have dismissed the complaint on the ground that those allegations, considered
in light of the facts on which they were based, do not have sufficient probative
value to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.
Greebel’s treatment of plaintiffs’ “warehousing allegations”—their claim
that, during the class period, FTP recorded as “sales” shipments it made to a
warehouse (rather than to customers) and later accepted back as returned
99. Id. at 196 n.9.  The court also discusses the fact that “[t]he device of effecting policy-based
change through adjustments in procedural or evidentiary rules is not new, nor is it unique to Congress.”
Id.
100. Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 201.
102. Id. at 202.
103. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Dumain, first told the court: “I will tell you specifically she will testify
that she was told it happened, and that she will identify the persons.”  Greebel Appendix, supra, note
83, at 1209 (transcript of hearing, Apr. 29, 1997).  Mr. Dumain later suggested that “every time we have
asked her to tell us who at the company” spoke to her, Ms. Nichols was unwilling to do so.  Id. at 1214.
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goods—supports this conclusion.104  As with the “white out” claims, the court
suggested that these allegations, if true, “are very serious.”105  But the court then
dismissed these allegations because, considering the facts on which they are
based, they “are not enough to support a strong inference of scienter.”106
The court’s discussion of the “white out” and “warehousing” allegations
highlights a key aspect of the relationship between section (b)(1) and section
(b)(2).  Under section (b)(1), a plaintiff must disclose the basis for each allega-
tion made on information and belief.  The nature and quality of the factual ba-
sis for each such allegation then becomes relevant to the court’s determination
as to whether the plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to give rise to a strong infer-
ence of scienter.
Greebel establishes that a hearsay statement by one person with no first
hand information as to the relevant facts, standing alone, generally will not suf-
fice.  Neither will facts suggesting a corporation engaged in some improper
practice before the start of the class period.107  Other claims, based on other
facts, no doubt will give rise to more difficult questions.
Greebel’s analysis of plaintiffs’ other allegations, concerning “channel stuff-
ing” and contingent sales, illustrate the importance of the court’s holding that to
satisfy section (b)(2), a plaintiff must plead facts that give rise to a strong infer-
ence of scienter.  The court avoided the sticky question of whether the district
court should have considered the arguably “tainted” evidence plaintiffs ob-
tained through discovery by holding that even had plaintiffs incorporated that
additional evidence into their complaint, they still failed to plead facts sufficient
to create a strong inference of scienter.108
The court quickly dispensed with the “channel stuffing”109 allegations.  It
treated them as adequately corroborated and noted that evidence of channel
stuffing “has some probative value.”110  But, the court continued, “that value is




108. See id., 194 F.3d at 204.  I term the question “sticky” because the court had no easy way to an-
swer it.  If Greebel had held that the district court should have considered that evidence, plaintiffs who
knew they could not satisfy the Basis Requirement might have been tempted to “manufacture” bogus
sources for critical allegations they made on information and belief, in the hope that through discovery,
they would be able to find evidence of fraud (and thus avoid sanctions under Rule 11).  On the other
hand, if Greebel had concluded that the district court properly refused to consider evidence plaintiffs
had discovered, and that that evidence created (or might have created) a strong inference of scienter,
the court effectively would have acknowledged that the Reform Act may shield from prosecution likely
instances of securities fraud.  Cf. In re South Pac. Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Or.
1999) (denying renewed motion to dismiss and allowing plaintiffs to rely on fruits of discovery obtained
after court’s original decision denying motion to dismiss, which was inconsistent with but issued prior to
Silicon Graphics).
109. “‘Channel stuffing’ means inducing purchasers to increase substantially their purchases before
they would, in the normal course, otherwise purchase products from the company.  It has the result of
shifting earnings into earlier quarters, quite likely to the detriment of earnings in later quarters.”
Greebel, 194 F.3d at 202.
110. Id. at 203.
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weak.  Unlike altering company documents, there may be any number of le-
gitimate reasons for attempting to achieve sales earlier.  Thus, [plaintiffs’ chan-
nel stuffing evidence] does not support a strong inference of scienter.”111  The
court underlined the significance of the “strong inference” requirement by
noting that “[b]efore the PSLRA, a number of courts gave weight to channel
stuffing allegations in refusing to grant stays of discovery or motions for dis-
missal or summary judgment.”112
Greebel’s treatment of plaintiffs’ claims concerning FTP’s contingent sales
had a similar effect.  Plaintiffs produced evidence of one transaction that FTP
booked as a sale even though the customer had an unqualified right to return
the product within sixty days.  The court pointed out that under generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), a seller is permitted to treat such a
transaction as a sale if it establishes a reasonable reserve for returns.  Plaintiffs
pled no facts indicating FTP failed to establish an adequate reserve, leading the
court to conclude:
Without any information on FTP’s experience with past return rates, the size of its re-
serve for returns, or how the reserve changed over time, it is difficult to infer that
FTP’s revenue recognition decisions were unreasonable enough to violate GAAP, or
that they give rise to a strong inference of scienter.113
The court acknowledged that in September 1995, FTP probably should not
have booked as a sale a $1.14 million order placed on September 28 for soft-
ware that documents indicated FTP had not yet fully developed.  But, the court
argued, “[i]t is a leap from there to a strong inference of scienter.”114  Even when
considered together with another clearly contingent order for $416,325 that
FTP also booked as a sale in September, the court pointed out that plaintiffs’
additional evidence indicates only that FTP improperly recognized between
$416,000 and $1.55 million in revenue in a quarter in which its total revenues
were $37.1 million.  This, Greebel holds, “do[es] not support a strong inference
of scienter.  It is equally possible to conclude that FTP made some incorrect ac-
counting decisions regarding a limited number of transactions.  Seeing fraud . . .
requires too great of an inferential leap.”115
111. Id.
112. Id. at 203 n.16 (citing cases).  Greebel contrasted these with a post-PSLRA district court deci-
sion, Lirette v. Shiva Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 268, 282-83 (D. Mass. 1998), which holds that allegations of
channel stuffing are not sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter.
113. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 205.  As concerns another set of transactions, where plaintiffs submitted
documents indicating that FTP improperly booked a $138,078 transaction as a sale and improperly
booked as sales two transactions in September totaling $548,192, which remained largely unpaid as of
December 31, 1995, Greebel appears to disregard the first as inconsequential and holds as to the others
that “[t]he mere existence of an overdue receivable does not support an inference that the original
transaction was booked as a sale in violation of GAAP.”  See id. at 204.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 206 (footnote omitted).  The court contrasts this with a case on which plaintiff produced
evidence of a questionable sale that accounted for $5 million of a corporation’s $9 million in quarterly
revenues.  See id. at 206 n.18.
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Finally,116 the court acknowledged that the Reform Act’s new pleading re-
quirements dictated the result it reached:
The difficult and different balance the [Reform] Act now requires—testing allegations
before little or no discovery, but holding plaintiffs to a strong inference of scienter
standard—has been honored in this case.  Plaintiffs did not have enough weight on
their side of the balance to meet the requirements of the Act, and so we affirm the
dismissal.117
V
TWO IMPORTANT PENDING CASES
Two cases with different procedural postures currently pending in the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits could provide important clues as to whether those courts
will similarly honor Congress’s intent in their interpretation of the PSLRA.  In
Novak v. Kasaks,118 the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a district court
decision dismissing a securities fraud complaint.  Novak’s significance is un-
clear.  It could reflect the Second Circuit’s resolve to interpret sections (b)(1)
and (b)(2) in a considerably more relaxed fashion than Silicon Graphics and
Greebel, or it could represent no more than a holding that plaintiffs are not re-
quired to include in their complaints the names of the individuals who were the
sources of information on which plaintiffs based their allegations.
The district court wrongly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss in In re Cell
Pathways, Inc. Securities Litigation.119  The district court’s opinion, written after
defendants petitioned the Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus, calls attention
to that petition and thus increases Cell Pathways’ potential significance. 120
A. Novak v. Kasaks
Novak involves an amalgam of issues similar to those addressed in Silicon
Graphics and Greebel.  Suit was brought on behalf of all persons who purchased
AnnTaylor Stores Corporation (“AnnTaylor”) stock between February 3, 1994,
the date on which AnnTaylor announced its FY 1994 results, and May 4, 1995,
the date on which AnnTaylor unexpectedly announced reduced same-store
sales and sharply lower earnings for the first quarter of FY 1995.121  AnnTaylor
116. The court also held that plaintiffs’ allegations relating to insider trading did not support a
strong inference of scienter.  See id. at 206-07.
117. Id. at 207.
118. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000).  The petition for certiorari was filed
and denied after this article was written.  Other developments subsequent to September 1, 2000, are
discussed infra in note 186.
119.   In re Cell Pathways, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,001 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000).
120. See id. at *1-2; Petition of Cell Pathways, Inc., Bob Towarnicki and Rifat Pamukcu for Writ of
Mandamus, In re Cell Pathways, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,001 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000) (No.
99-752) [hereinafter “CPI Petition”].
121. See Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at ¶ 1, Novak v.
Kasaks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (No. 96CIV3073) [hereinafter Novak Amended Complaint].
AnnTaylor’s fiscal year ended on the Saturday closest to January 31 of the following calendar year, so
that FY 1994 ended on January 28, 1995.  See id. ¶ 9(d).
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blamed its problems on a weak retail environment and on merchandising prob-
lems with its spring line of clothing.122  The market reacted quickly:  The price of
AnnTaylor stock, which had declined substantially during the previous month,
dropped an additional twenty-five percent on May 5.123
1. The District Court’s Decisions.  Plaintiffs’ original complaint, filed almost
one year later,124 consisted largely of uncorroborated allegations to the effect
that AnnTaylor and certain of its executives had engaged in “an elaborate ‘Box
& Hold’ scheme”125 in which they “knowingly and intentionally issued financial
statements that overstated AnnTaylor’s financial condition by accounting for
inventory that they knew to be obsolete and nearly worthless at inflated values
122. See Jennifer L. Brady & Thomas J. Ryan, First Quarter Slump for The Limited, Nordstrom,
Ann Taylor, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, May 10, 1995, available in WL 8304453.  AnnTaylor had turned
in a standout performance in the highly competitive women’s fashion industry in FY 1994.  See id.
123. See Novak Amended Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 92.
124. See Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F.
Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (No. 96CIV3073), available at (visited Oct. 1, 2000) <http://securi
ties.stanford.edu/complaints/anntaylor/96cv03073/001.html> [hereinafter Novak Original Complaint].
Plaintiffs sued both AnnTaylor and associated individuals (“AnnTaylor defendants”) and Merrill
Lynch and associated individuals (“Merrill Lynch defendants”).  The Merrill Lynch defendants eventu-
ally settled with plaintiffs for $3 million, which represents a very small percentage of the damages
claimed.  See Settlements: AnnTaylor Stores Corporation, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION ALERT, Nov.
1999, at 28.
125. See Novak Amended Complaint, supra note 121, ¶¶ 31-32.  The amended complaint described
the alleged “Box & Hold” scheme as follows:
31.  Prior to and throughout the Class Period, AnnTaylor had accumulated huge
amounts of excessive merchandise inventories beyond the levels internally budgeted or
planned for by defendants which had not been marked-down and disposed of through the
Company’s stated markdown and Factory store clearance process.  To hide this serious
problem from the marketplace and the investing public and to avoid large write-downs and
liquidation of the excessive inventories and thereby artificially inflate AnnTaylor’s reported
profits and margins and future earnings estimates, defendants engaged in an elaborate “Box
& Hold” scheme, whereby millions of dollars of excessive and nearly worthless inventories
were stored in two secret warehouse locations throughout the Class Period.  Rather than
write-down and liquidate these excessive inventories which had not been sold (and which
AnnTaylor’s Factory stores would not accept for sale due to their own excess inventory
problems), prior to the start of the Class Period, defendants set up a procedure whereby the
inventory would be “Boxed” in cartons and removed from AnnTaylor stores and shipped to
two secret warehouses to “Hold” for later disposition.  As part of this scheme, “Box and
Hold” labels were sent to each AnnTaylor store which were affixed to the outside of the car-
tons that were shipped to the warehouses on a regular basis.  This procedure also alleviated
the pressure on the individual AnnTaylor stores which were overburdened with inventories
and did not have the space to store out of season and outdated merchandise.
32.  Initially, and before the start of the Class Period, AnnTaylor’s insiders hoped that
the Company would be able to dispose of and sell such excess inventory later, through re-
duced prices at AnnTaylor Factory (clearance) stores.  However, this never happened.  Box
& Hold inventories grew out of control by the start of the Class Period, with AnnTaylor
having accumulated, approximately $6 million of excessive and nearly worthless Box & Hold
inventory by February 2, 1994, including out-of-season goods from as far back as 1992!  This
Box & Hold inventory (which continued to grow at an alarming rate) remained inside of the
Box & Hold warehouses throughout the Class Period, without write-down or disposition, in
part because the AnnTaylor Loft and Factory stores . . . had their own serious problems with
excess inventories and refused to accept excess AnnTaylor stores inventory for clearance
sales.
Id. ¶¶ 31-32.
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and by deliberately failing to adhere to the Company’s publicly stated
markdown policy.”126
The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ original complaint, holding that it
“fail[ed] to allege with sufficient specificity that at the time the AnnTaylor de-
fendants made favorable statements to securities analysts, they were aware that
much of their inventory was worthless or seriously overvalued, or were reckless
as to whether that was the case.”127  The court also pointed out that while plain-
tiffs’ claims focused on the alleged “Box & Hold” scheme, “[t]he term ‘box-
and-hold’ is nowhere defined in the complaint.”128  The court observed that
plaintiffs, instead of providing details to support the allegations as required by
Rule 9(b), relied on “conclusory language” and “hot words.”129
The court also addressed plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the Basis Requirement,
holding that plaintiffs’ umbrella description of the basis for their claims130 “pro-
vides none of the required facts underlying the complaint’s allegations as to the
information that was available to the individual defendants, nor does it direct
the Court to where those facts might be found”;131 that the district court in Sili-
con Graphics rejected an identical paragraph as insufficiently specific;132 and
that plaintiffs “also provide no basis for their allegation that ‘throughout the
Class Period, AnnTaylor was falsifying and artificially inflating its reported net
income and earnings per share via its “box-and-hold” scheme to hide excess,
slow-moving and/or unsalable inventory and avoid writing off that inven-
tory.’”133
126. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2000).
127. Novak, 997 F. Supp. at 431.  The court added,
[t]his deficiency is particularly striking where the target of the allegations is conceded to be “a
specialty retailer of women’s apparel, shoes, and accessories;” a company engaged in a busi-
ness that is affected by considerations of fashion and taste.  In effect, AnnTaylor was neces-
sarily involved in the generation of inventory based upon predictions as to product that was
expected to sell at a particular time or season.
Id.
128. Id.  The court also observed that
[c]ounsel for the AnnTaylor defendants stated at oral argument that AnnTaylor does, in fact,
transfer merchandise to warehouses on a seasonal basis, that some of this merchandise is ul-
timately sold at less than full price, and that the value of this inventory is written down on the
books as markdowns are taken.
Id. at 432.
129. Id. at 421 (citations to original complaint omitted).
130. Plaintiffs asserted that the allegations in the original complaint were “based upon the investiga-
tion of their counsel, which included a review of AnnTaylor’s SEC filings, securities analysts reports
and advisories about the Company, press releases issued by the Company, media reports about the
Company and discussions with consultants . . . .”  Novak Original Complaint, supra note 124, ¶ 138.  I
refer to this as an “umbrella description” because plaintiffs made no effort to tie specific allegations to
specific sources.
131. Novak, 997 F. Supp. at 431.
132. See id.  The resemblance may not be coincidental, as plaintiffs in both cases were represented
by Milberg Weiss Hynes Bershad & Lerach, LLP.
133. Id.
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Plaintiffs thereafter filed an amended complaint.134  They added to their
listing of the categories of information on which their claims were based135 “in-
ternal AnnTaylor documents obtained through plaintiffs’ investigation; and
documents produced by various non-parties to this litigation, as well as confi-
dential communications with certain former AnnTaylor employees and inde-
pendent consultants.”136  Plaintiffs also made additional, arguably significant,
substantive allegations, apparently based on these newly listed sources.
Plaintiffs now alleged that an AnnTaylor internal document,  a “Weekly
Report” dated January 22, 1996, “demonstrates that . . . over six months after
the end of the Class period,”137 AnnTaylor’s “Box & Hold” inventory contained
thirteen percent of the “apparel units” and twenty percent of the “shoe units,”
“consist[ing] primarily of 1993 and 1994 Class Period merchandise” and having
a reported value of $14 million, which was equal to fourteen percent of the
publicly reported value of AnnTaylor’s inventory as of January 28, 1996.138
Plaintiffs further asserted that the “actual value” of the January 22, 1996 “Box
& Hold” inventory “was nearly zero” but did not attribute this claim to the
January 22, 1996 Report or to any other source.139  They also alleged that similar
Weekly Reports with the same format as the January 22, 1996 Report were dis-
tributed to AnnTaylor’s senior management every Monday during the class pe-
riod.140
Finally, plaintiffs alleged in paragraph 35 of their amended complaint that
during the class period there were numerous discussions, involving three senior
AnnTaylor executives named as individual defendants and other AnnTaylor
executives, in which “many AnnTaylor executives demanded that [these indi-
vidual defendants] end the Box & Hold practice as it made no business sense
and was growing out of control.”141  The response of the three individual defen-
dants, plaintiffs claimed,
was that AnnTaylor could not “afford” to eliminate or write-down the Box & Hold
inventory because doing so would “kill” the Company’s reported financial results
and/or profit margins and damage the Company on “Wall Street”. . . [and that each
individual defendant] knew, at all relevant times, that this inventory due to its age and
condition was nearly worthless and could not and would not be sold at its stated
value.142
Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, which the district court subse-
quently granted.143  The court held that plaintiffs’ additions failed to correct the
deficiencies in the original complaint, “or even to address them in any meaning-
134. The district court’s first decision granted plaintiffs 30 days to re-plead their case.  See id. at 435.
135. See text supra note 130.
136. Novak Amended Complaint, supra note 121, at introductory par. (numbers in listing omitted).
137. Id. ¶ 37 (emphasis in original).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. ¶ 34.
141. Id. ¶ 35.
142. Id.
143. See Novak v. Kasaks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 658, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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ful way.”144  The new allegations appeared “to be directed at demonstrating that
the AnnTaylor defendants knew that the box-and-hold inventory ‘was nearly
worthless and could not and would not be sold at its stated value.’”145  Accepting
arguendo plaintiffs’ claim that AnnTaylor’s top managers received a report
each Monday detailing AnnTaylor’s inventory, including Box & Hold inventory
“subdivided into seasonal lines (e.g., ‘Fall 92’),”146 the court pointed out that
“these documents, if they exist, do nothing more than confirm a fact already ac-
knowledged by AnnTaylor—that AnnTaylor held merchandise in warehouses
and ultimately marked down this merchandise.”147
Similarly, the district court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning
the January 22, 1996 Weekly Report did not advance their cause.  First, the
court questioned the relevance of “a document describing the situation which
existed, as plaintiffs emphatically put it, over six months after the end of the
Class Period.”148  The court then noted that, “[b]y plaintiffs’ own count, there
were 460,230 units of warehoused inventory.  Dividing this number into $14
million results in an average value of $30 per unit.  Plaintiffs offer no explana-
tion as to why that number is an excessive average valuation for upscale cloth-
ing and shoes.”149  Finally, and “perhaps most importantly,” the court high-
lighted the fact that “plaintiffs offer no support for the allegation that the value
of the box and hold inventory was ‘nearly zero,’ nor do they attempt to demon-
strate why $14 million was not a proper value to assign to the inventory.”150  In
sum, the court suggested that even if plaintiffs had been able to show that at
some time during the class period, AnnTaylor held Box & Hold inventory in
amounts identical to those it allegedly held on January 22, 1996, the court
would not, without more, find those facts sufficient to create a strong inference
of scienter.  In this respect, the district court’s approach was much the same as
that the First Circuit subsequently adopted in Greebel.
That leaves the allegations in paragraph 35, which the district court causti-
cally described as “an excellent example of the improper pleading which leads
the Court once again to dismiss the complaint.”151  But here the court’s reason-
ing, while fundamentally sound, may not have been sufficiently nuanced.  The
court first faulted plaintiffs for not identifying the individual “former employ-
144. Id.
145. Id. at 661 (citation to amended complaint omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 662.  The court’s statement that this information has “no relevance” may go too far.  It
seems more accurate to say, as the court did in Greebel, that in light of the seasonality of AnnTaylor’s
business and of its sensitivity to fashion trends, the fact that AnnTaylor had this amount of Box & Hold
inventory eight months after the end of the class period might have some probative value, “[b]ut that
value is weak.” Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 203 (1st Cir. 1999); see supra text accom-
panying notes 111-112.
149. See Novak, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 662.  The court also observed that it “is unable to ascertain the
meaning” of plaintiffs’ claim that the January 22, 1996 Box and Hold inventory consists “primarily” of
1993 and 1994 class period merchandise.  Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 661.
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ees” on whose reports it assumed paragraph 35 was based, a failure that it said
“ignores the clear mandate of the Court in our earlier opinion, and is contrary
to the particularity requirements of [section (b)(1)].”152  The court was correct
insofar as it held that plaintiffs did not satisfy the Basis Requirement with re-
spect to paragraph 35, because nowhere in the amended complaint did plaintiffs
identify the facts on which they based the allegations in that paragraph.153  But
the court was on less solid ground to the extent that it refused to credit the alle-
gations in paragraph 35 solely because plaintiffs did not name the former em-
ployees on whom they relied.  It was not clear then, and is not clear now,
whether a plaintiff must name all of her testimonial sources to satisfy the Basis
Requirement.154
The court also found that the allegations in paragraph 35, if credited, would
reflect “nothing more than disagreement by certain AnnTaylor executives with
business decisions made by the AnnTaylor defendants.”155  But close reading
suggests that plaintiffs reasonably could contend that paragraph 35 suggests the
three individual defendants rejected demands that they write down the Box &
Hold inventory because they were concerned that such action would negatively
affect the price of AnnTaylor stock.  Plaintiffs’ claim then would appear to be
analogous to the “white out” claim that Greebel held could (if adequately cor-
roborated) create a strong inference of scienter.156
But while the premise of this argument seems correct, the conclusion is
flawed.  Even if the allegations in paragraph 35 arguably support a reasonable
inference that the individual defendants acted with scienter, they fall far short
of compelling such an inference.  Whiting out notations on purchase orders to
deceive a company’s auditors can serve no legitimate purpose.  In contrast, even
were the court prepared to accept that the conversations described in paragraph
35 actually occurred, it still could read that paragraph to suggest no more than
that the individual defendants expressed both concern about the impact that
writing down the value of Box & Hold inventory would have on the price of
AnnTaylor’s stock and a good faith belief that writing down that inventory
would be premature.157
Such an interpretation may be what the court intended to suggest when it
stated that “plaintiffs offer absolutely no support for the conclusory, unsup-
ported and inflammatory allegation that the AnnTaylor defendants knew the
box and hold inventory to be ‘nearly worthless.’”158  Plaintiffs might respond
that a reasonable implication of the allegations in paragraph 35 is that some
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 1999); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193.
154. Neither Silicon Graphics or Greebel explicitly sets forth such a requirement.
155. Novak, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 661.
156. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201.
157. The court might also criticize paragraph 35 on the ground that plaintiffs do not attribute spe-
cific statements to identified defendants.  See infra note 179.
158. Novak, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 661.  Plaintiffs do not expressly claim that any participant in the al-
leged discussions admitted that the Box & Hold inventory was nearly worthless.
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AnnTaylor executives expressed concern that Box & Hold inventory had grown
so large that AnnTaylor would have difficulty selling it at a profit.  But it does
not follow that the defendant executives shared (or recklessly disregarded the
basis for) the other executives’ belief.  Thus, plaintiffs’ allegations, if credited,
still are not sufficient to support a strong inference that the defendant execu-
tives acted with an intent to deceive or defraud.
In short, the district court could have rejected the allegations in paragraph
35 in a manner consistent with the principles subsequently articulated in Silicon
Graphics and Greebel.159  The reasons that the court advanced for rejecting
those allegations, however, rendered its decision vulnerable to criticism.  Plain-
tiffs focused on those reasons when they appealed to the Second Circuit.
2. The Second Circuit’s Decision.  Rather than confining itself to these
issues, the Second Circuit used Novak as a vehicle to discuss both general
pleading issues under sections (b)(1) and (b)(2) and the specific issues Novak
raised.160  Unfortunately, the court’s discussion of both sets of issues is confusing
and contradictory.
a. Pleading standards under the Reform Act.  The court observed that
“[t]he landscape of securities fraud litigation has been transformed in recent
years by the passage of the PSLRA.”161  After briefly reviewing the history of
the Reform Act and quoting sections (b)(1) and (b)(2), the court noted that a
simple restatement of the Second Circuit’s oft-quoted, two-part strong
inference test “conceals the complexity and uncertainty that often surround its
application”162 and acknowledged that “different courts applying the pleading
standard to differing factual circumstances may reach seemingly disparate
results.”163  The court noted, however, that “we discern some basic patterns in
our [pre-Reform Act] case law under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that help to
provide substance to the general language of the standard itself.”164
Novak’s summary of the law concerning motive and intentional misconduct
is straightforward,165 unlike its discussion of recklessness.  After reiterating that
the Second Circuit adopted a general definition of recklessness based on Sund-
159. Greebel also makes clear that had plaintiffs disclosed that they based paragraph 35 on hearsay
statements by a former AnnTaylor employee, or similarly unreliable facts, the court would have been
justified in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss.  See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 191.
160. The Second Circuit had previously characterized, without discussion, the Reform Act’s plead-
ing requirement as embodying that court’s pre-Reform Act case law.  See Press v. Chemical Invest.
Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).  Novak characterizes Press’s statement as dicta.  See No-
vak, 216 F.3d at 310.
161. See Novak, 216 F.3d at 305.
162. Id. at 307.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The court states that “in the ordinary case, adequate motive arose from the desire to profit
from extensive insider sales.” See id. at 308.  Intentional misconduct “encompasses deliberate illegal
behavior, such as securities trading by insiders privy to undisclosed and material information . . . or
knowing sale of a company’s stock at an unwarranted discount.”  Id. (citation omitted).
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strand,166 the court observed that its pre-PSLRA cases upheld claims of reck-
lessness where plaintiffs alleged that “defendants knew or, more importantly,
should have known that they were misrepresenting material facts related to the
corporation.”167  The court seemingly did not recognize that the latter part of
this statement sets forth a negligence standard that is far less demanding than
the “extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care” that Sundstrand
requires.168  Novak then compounds the confusion by citing as examples of this
standard two cases that did not rely upon it.169
Similarly, Novak again uses language suggesting negligence when it states:
“Under certain circumstances, we have found allegations of recklessness to be
sufficient where plaintiffs alleged facts demonstrating that defendants failed to
review or check information that they had a duty to monitor, or ignored obvi-
ous signs of fraud.”170  Moreover, while the court pointed out that it has refused
to allow plaintiffs to proceed on the basis of allegations of “fraud by hindsight”
and that “there are limits to the scope of liability for failure adequately to moni-
tor the allegedly fraudulent behavior of others,”171 it provided no indication of
the principles on which its cases rely to set those limits.
If this portion of Novak represented only a recounting of pre-Reform Act
authority, one might dismiss as unimportant the court’s errors and omissions.
But the court perpetuated the possibility that a plaintiff can create a strong in-
ference of scienter by pleading facts that suggest only negligence when it con-
cluded its analysis of section (b)(2) as follows:
When all is said and done, we believe that the enactment of paragraph  (b)(2) did not
change the basic pleading standard for scienter in this circuit (except by the addition
of the words “with particularity”).  Accordingly, we hold that the PSLRA adopted our
“strong inference” standard: In order to plead scienter, plaintiffs must “state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the re-
quired state of mind,” as required by the language of the Act itself . . . . [I]n applying
this standard, district courts should look to the cases and factors discussed . . . above
to determine whether plaintiffs have pleaded facts giving rise to the requisite “strong
inference.”  These cases suggest, in brief, that the inference may arise where the com-
plaint sufficiently alleges that the defendants: (1) benefitted in a concrete and per-
sonal way from the purported fraud; (2) engaged in deliberately illegal behavior; (3)
166. The court does not attribute that standard to Sunstrand, however.  See id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id. (citing Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)).
169. See id.  The first, Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1989), does not discuss scienter on
the page Novak cites.  When Cosmas does address scienter, it upholds the complaint at least in part be-
cause plaintiffs’ allegations “do establish a motive.”  Id. at 13.  The second, Goldman v. Belden, 754
F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985), held that “Rule 9(b) allows intent and knowledge to be alleged gener-
ally . . . .”
170. Novak, 216 F.3d at 308 (emphasis added).  While the first part of the quoted statement uses the
language of negligence, the second part is ambiguous.  Moreover, the first case Novak cites in support
of this statement also found that plaintiff adequately alleged defendants had a motive to ignore mate-
rial facts.  Id. (citing Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47-48).
171. Novak, 216 F.3d at 309.
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knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements were not
accurate; or (4) failed to check information they had a duty to monitor.172
Aside from quoting section (b)(1), the only statement in this portion of No-
vak that arguably relates to the Basis Requirement is the court’s reference to its
pre-Reform Act requirement that plaintiffs who contend defendants had access
to facts contrary to their public statements “must specifically identify the re-
ports or statements containing this information.”173  However, Novak’s discus-
sion is incomplete and therefore potentially confusing in that the court failed to
mention that the Second Circuit decision it cited expressly relies on First and
Seventh Circuit decisions that require a plaintiff “to ‘specifically identify the in-
ternal reports and public statements underlying their claims, providing names
and dates,’” and to “indicate such matters as ‘who prepared the projected fig-
ures, when they were prepared, how firm the numbers were, or which [com-
pany] officers reviewed them.’”174  Thus, the court left unclear until it discussed
the complaint in the instant case the extent to which it believed section (b)(1) or
the words “with particularity” in section (b)(2) incorporate these more rigorous
pleading requirements.
b. Analysis of the AnnTaylor complaint.  Novak’s discussion of the
AnnTaylor complaint and of the district court’s decision is even more baffling.
The court opened this discussion by summarizing plaintiffs’ claims that the
AnnTaylor defendants “engaged in conscious misstatements with the intent to
deceive,” and then stated: “There is no doubt that this pleading satisfies the
standard for scienter under Hochfelder and the requirement of the PSLRA that
plaintiffs state facts with particularity that give rise to a strong inference of the
required state of mind.”175  In addition, the court identified as “documentary
sources that support the plaintiffs’ belief that serious inventory problems ex-
isted during the Class Period itself” statements AnnTaylor allegedly made at
the end of the first and second quarters of FY 1995, which is after the end of the
class period, and data in the January 22, 1996 Weekly Report.176
172. Id. at 311 (emphasis added) (internal cross-citations omitted).  In the first part of the quoted
paragraph, the court may have been referring to the distinction Roskoski notes between its pre-PSLRA
“standard” and the “tests” it used to determine whether a plaintiff had met that standard.  See Rosko-
ski, supra note 14.
173. Novak, 216 F.3d at 309.
174. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 75
F.3d 801, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Serrabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 365 (1st
Cir. 1994)); Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1467 (7th Cir. 1993) (bracketed material added by court).
175. Novak, 216 F.3d at 312.
176. Id. at 313.  An additional indication of the sloppiness of the court’s opinion is that the state-
ments the court purports to relate to AnnTaylor’s first quarter FY 1995 report in fact represent plain-
tiffs’ unattributed allegations concerning statements an unidentified AnnTaylor employee made to
analysts.  See Novak Amended Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 92.  Moreover, the court ignored com-
pletely both the district court’s careful explanation of its reasons for concluding the January 22, 1996
data has almost no probative value and the district court’s description of AnnTaylor’s business as vul-
nerable to sharp fluctuations due to changing consumer tastes and purchasing patterns.  See Jennifer L.
Brady, April Sales Brought Letdown for Stores; Easter Didn’t Help, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, May 5,
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The court’s ultimate disposition of plaintiffs’ appeal, however, appears flatly
inconsistent with the above discussion.  The court first declared: “We express
no view as to whether the plaintiffs’ allegations in this case were sufficiently
particularized.”177  It then remanded the case to the district court “with instruc-
tions to: (1) allow the plaintiffs to replead in light of our discussion above; and
(2) reconsider the particularity of the plaintiffs’ pleadings in light of the proper
standards.”178  This disposition makes no sense whatsoever if, as the court earlier
stated, the complaint “satisfies the standard for scienter under Hochfelder, and
the requirement of the PSLRA that plaintiffs state facts with particularity that
give rise to a strong inference of the required state of mind,” and if plaintiffs
have adequately identified “documentary sources that support [their] belief that
serious inventory problems existed during the Class Period itself.”179
The best way to make sense of Novak, I believe, is to focus not on these
conflicting statements but on the court’s conclusion that a plaintiff can comply
with the Basis Requirement without naming confidential sources.  On this issue,
the court held:
[O]ur reading of the PSLRA rejects any notion that confidential sources must be
named as a general matter.  In our view, notwithstanding the use of the word “all,”
paragraph (b)(1) does not require that plaintiffs plead with particularity every single
fact upon which their beliefs concerning false or misleading statements are based.
Rather, plaintiffs need only plead with particularity sufficient facts to support those
beliefs.  Accordingly, where plaintiffs rely on confidential personal sources but also on
other facts, they need not name their sources as long as the latter facts provide an
adequate basis for believing that the defendants’ statements were false.  Moreover,
even if personal sources must be identified, there is no requirement that they be
named, provided they are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to
support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would
possess the information alleged.180
1995, available in WL 8304420 (reporting that several major women’s clothing retailers reported “dis-
heartening” Easter results).
177. Novak, 216 F.3d at 314.
178. Id.
179. An additional flaw in Novak is the conclusion that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning statements
allegedly made to analysts by the AnnTaylor defendants “were sufficiently detailed to meet the plead-
ing threshold because generally the circumstances of the statements—including dates and partici-
pants—were particularized.” Id. at 314 (citing Acito v. Imcera Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
1995)).  Acito does not address the issue of when statements allegedly made to analysts can be attrib-
uted to an issuer.
Time Warner, the governing authority on this issue, holds that Rule 9(b) requires, “at a minimum,
that the plaintiff identify the speaker of the allegedly fraudulent statements.”  In re Time Warner, Inc.
Sec. Lit., 9 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs’ amended complaint claims only
that two individual defendants spoke to analysts and does not attribute specific, allegedly false or mis-
leading statements to either of them.  See Novak Amended Complaint, supra note 121, ¶¶ 70-74, 78-81.
180. Novak, 216 F.3d at 313-14 (footnote omitted).  In the footnote to this passage, the court as-
tutely observed that
paragraph (b)(1) is strangely drafted.  Reading “all” literally would produce illogical results
that Congress cannot have intended.  Contrary to the clearly expressed purpose of the
PSLRA, it would allow complaints to survive dismissal where “all” the facts supporting the
plaintiff’s information and belief were pled, but those facts were patently insufficient to sup-
port that belief.  Equally peculiarly, it would require dismissal where the complaint pled facts
fully sufficient to support a convincing inference if any known facts were omitted.  Our read-
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The court then explained that plaintiffs can satisfy the Basis Requirement
“by providing documentary evidence and/or a sufficient general description of
the personal sources of the plaintiffs’ beliefs.”181  Either kind of information
serves the underlying purpose of section (b)(1), which is to ensure that plaintiffs
“supply sufficient specific facts to support their allegations.”182  The court’s in-
structions on remand are consistent with this explanation.183
3. The Issues on Remand.  Although Novak is confusing in numerous
respects, focusing on the court’s holding concerning sources makes it possible to
set forth a reasonably coherent interpretation of the court’s decision that also is
consistent with Silicon Graphics and Greebel.184  That interpretation is as
follows:
(1) Plaintiffs’ can satisfy the scienter requirement established by
Hochfelder and by section (b)(2) by claiming that the AnnTaylor
defendants made public statements that conflicted with facts they
knew or recklessly disregarded.  Consequently, the district court
cannot dismiss this claim on business judgment grounds.  However,
it remains an open question whether plaintiffs have satisfied the re-
quirement that they plead all facts on which this claim is based.185
(2) Plaintiffs are not required to name their confidential sources, but to
satisfy sections (b)(1) and (b)(2), they must describe the documen-
tary and/or personal sources on which they rely; moreover, their
allegations, considered in light of the sources on which they are
based, must support a strong inference that the AnnTaylor defen-
dants acted with scienter.
ing of the provision focuses on whether the facts alleged are sufficient to support a reasonable
belief as to the misleading nature of the statement or omission.
Id. at 314 n.1.
I previously made a similar argument, to the effect that plaintiffs should be free to decide what in-
formation to reveal about their sources and that courts should take account of the basis for plaintiffs’
allegations when deciding whether they give rise to a strong inference of scienter.  See Weiss & Moser,
supra note 16, at 471 n.71.  Moreover, the court ignored completely both the district court’s careful ex-
planation of its reasons for concluding the January 22, 1996 data has almost no probative value and the
district court’s description of AnnTaylor’s business as vulnerable to sharp fluctuations due to changing
consumer tastes and purchasing patterns.
181. Novak, 216 F.3d at 314.
182. Id.
183. See supra text accompanying note 175.
184. The interpretation that follows is influenced by the organization of Novak.  Several of the
court’s statements therein make more sense when viewed in relation to the headings of the sections of
the opinion in which they appear than if compared to seemingly inconsistent statements in other sec-
tions of the opinion.
185. Admittedly, the court stated as part of this holding that plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy “the re-
quirement of the PSLRA that plaintiffs state facts with particularity that give rise to a strong inference
of the required state of mind.”  Novak, 216 F.3d at 314.  See supra text accompanying note 175.  How-
ever, this statement conflicts with the court’s disposition of plaintiffs’ appeal.  In addition, this state-
ment is made in the section of the opinion that addresses the substantive standard established by that §
21D(b)(2).  The best reading of Novak, in my view, is that the court meant this statement to reflect its
view that the facts pled by plaintiffs, if credited, would be sufficient to establish recklessness for pur-
poses of section (b)(2).
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(3) Now that the court has clarified the meaning of section (b)(1),
plaintiffs should be given a chance to replead their claims in light of
this clarification.
(4) The district court should then reconsider the complaint, including
any additional allegations plaintiffs choose to add, and decide
whether the plaintiffs’ well-pled allegations give rise to a strong in-
ference that the AnnTaylor defendants deliberately or recklessly
misrepresented material facts.
I assume, for purposes of discussion, that the Novak plaintiffs either will not
seek to amend their complaint or will amend it only to provide some additional
facts describing the source(s) of the allegations in paragraph 35.186  If this as-
sumption is correct, the district court, as the above discussion of its opinion sug-
gests, will be free again to dismiss their complaint.  More specifically, the dis-
trict court could reiterate that (1) the January 22, 1996 Weekly Report (and the
AnnTaylor defendants’ other post-class period statements) provide little sup-
port for plaintiffs’ claims that AnnTaylor held large amounts of virtually
worthless Box & Hold inventory during the class period, and (2) in any event,
plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have a reasonable factual basis for
their assertions concerning the amount and value of AnnTaylor’s Box & Hold
inventory during the class period.  As concerns paragraph 35, if plaintiffs do not
attribute the allegations therein to a person who was in a position to possess the
information alleged, the court should refuse to credit those allegations.  Even if
plaintiffs do attribute those allegations to a credible source, the district court
still could reasonably conclude that the facts alleged do not support a strong in-
ference of scienter.187
Should the district court reach such a conclusion, and should plaintiffs again
appeal, the Second Circuit might take that opportunity to clarify some of the
ambiguities in Novak.  More important, an appeal of such a decision also would
force the Second Circuit to clarify whether it interprets sections (b)(1) and
(b)(2) in much the same fashion as do Silicon Graphics and Greebel, or whether
186. This assumption seemed reasonable because the plaintiffs probably either believed that they
had already set forth a valid claim or possessed no additional facts to support the allegations they
made.  In any event, plaintiffs elected not to replead.  See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 1, Novak v. Kasaks, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2000) (96
Civ. 3073 (AGS)).  Defendants’ reply memorandum of law cites to and quotes from the discussion of
the issues on remand in a draft of this article posted at <http: //securities.stanford.edu/report> (visited
Feb. 4, 2001).  See Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint at 2-3, Novak (No. 96 Civ. 3073).
187. The district court might choose to contrast plaintiffs’ claim with the claims upheld in Rothman
v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000).  The plaintiffs there provided a well-reasoned explanation,
grounded in data drawn from the defendant corporations’ financial statements, to support their claim
that that corporation had recklessly failed to write off royalty payments it had capitalized.  See id. at 85.
They also relied on litigation documents that the defendant corporation had filed to support their claim
that it had no reasonable expectation of recovering the capitalized royalties.  See id. at 86.  In fact, the
only puzzling aspect of the court’s opinion in Rothman is its statement that “[t]he facts of the pending
case are not quite as strong as in Novak.”  Id. at 91.  The Rothman plaintiffs’ allegations may not have
been as strong, but the facts they pled, as described in the court’s opinion, seem to me to be considera-
bly stronger.
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the Second Circuit, once generally credited with having the most stringent
pleading standard for claims of securities fraud, is now inclined to uphold com-
plaints that the First and Ninth Circuits would dismiss.188
B. In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Securities Litigation
The facts of Cell Pathways are relatively straightforward.  Cell Pathways,
Inc. (“CPI”) is a bio-pharmaceutical company engaged in developing products
to prevent and treat cancer.  In 1991, CPI discovered a compound called exisu-
lind, subsequently given the trade name “Prevatac,” which CPI believed would
be useful in the treatment of colonic polyps and in the prevention of colon can-
cer.  Thereafter, CPI began clinical trials of Prevatac to test its efficacy on pa-
tients with adenomatous polyposis coli (“APC”), a rare condition in which pa-
tients form intestinal polyps that progress to colon cancer if not treated.189
In July 1998, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) granted CPI
“Fast Track” authority to begin a Phase II/III clinical study of Prevatac.190  On
October 7, 1998, CPI announced that it had filled its enrollment of the clinical
study.191  A month later, CPI issued a press release predicting that it would com-
plete the Phase II/III clinical study in January 1999 and stating that if the results
were favorable, it would seek FDA approval during the first half of 1999 to be-
gin marketing Prevatac to patients with APC.192
On February 1, 1999, CPI announced that the clinical trial had not produced
“a statistically significant clinical response.”193  In an interview with Bloomberg
Forum the following day, plaintiffs allege, CPI’s CEO “noted the possibility
188. Several recent decisions by district courts in the Second Circuit dismiss complaints because
plaintiffs failed to detail the basis for their allegations.  See Feasby v. Industri-Matemik Int’l Corp., No.
99 CIV.8761(HB), 2000 WL 977673, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000); Sabratek Corp. v. Keyser, No. 99
CIV. 8589(HB), 2000 WL 423529, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000); Ruskin v. TIG Holdings, Inc., No.
98 Civ. 1068 LLS, 1999 WL 756466, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1999).  But see In re MCI Worldcom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying a more lax scienter standard to a misrep-
resentation of marginal materiality).  Cf. Ruskin v. TIG Holdings, Inc., No. 98Civ.1068(LLS), 2000 WL
1154278, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (refusing to dismiss amended complaint identifying as basis for
plaintiffs’ allegations internal memoranda written by senior officers of defendant corporation).
After Silicon Graphics was handed down, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have consistently dis-
missed complaints when plaintiffs have not specified the basis for factual claims made on information
and belief.  Compare In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 810, 821 (N.D. Cal.
2000); In re FVC.Com Sec. Litig., No. 99-1815 CRB, 2000 WL 1202065, at *7  (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2000);
Dalarne Partners, Ltd. v. Synch Research, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 2000); In re CBT
Group PLC Sec. Litig., No. C-98-21014 RMW, 1999 WL 1249287, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 1999) (dis-
missing complaints) with Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91, 024
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2000) (upholding complaint based on identified e-mails and internal reports).  See
also In re Segue Software, Inc. Sec. Litig., 106 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2000) (post-Greebel decision
dismissing complaint quite similar to Novak Amended Complaint).
189. See In re Cell Pathways, No. 99-725, 2000 WL 805221, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000).
190. See Consolidated Amended Complaint ¶ 45, In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig., (E.D. Pa.
June 28, 1999) (No. 99-752) [hereinafter CPI Complaint].  Phase III is the final stage of clinical study of
a new pharmaceutical product.  See id. ¶¶ 40-42.
191. See id. ¶ 48.
192. See id. ¶ 49.
193. Id. ¶ 57.  This announcement led to a sharp decline in the price of CPI stock.  See id. ¶ 58.
However, plaintiffs make no claim that CPI ever misrepresented the potential of Prevatac.
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that design flaws, particularly in patient selection, could have accounted for the
drug’s apparent lack of statistically significant efficacy, and indicated his inten-
tion to review the findings of the trial.”194  CPI discussed the results of that re-
view on June 15-16, 1999, disclosing that (1) only thirty-four of the sixty-five pa-
tients who had completed the clinical trial in fact met its selection criteria; (2)
unqualified patients had been admitted to the study by referring physicians with
“little experience” with APC; (3) Prevatac had demonstrated statistically sig-
nificant benefits for the subgroup of eligible patients; and (4) because of the
small size of the subgroup of eligible patients, the FDA would require further
testing.195
Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of all persons who purchased CPI stock be-
tween October 8, 1998, and February 2, 1999, inclusive.196  Plaintiffs’ central
claim, which they based entirely on the statements by defendants described
above,197 was that CPI acted recklessly in designing the Phase II/III clinical trial
as it did:
What is clear from the disclosures made by defendants in June, 1999, is that in selecting
physicians to identify patients who would fall within the target population defendants
knowingly or recklessly disregarded, in their rush to complete the Fast Track approval
process, the great difficulty of identifying the target population in light of the rare na-
ture of APC and most physicians’ lack of familiarity with its symptoms.  Notwith-
standing that knowledge, defendants knowingly or recklessly failed to take steps to
ensure that the physicians identifying patients for the study had the special experience,
knowledge, qualifications, and expertise to perform their task properly.198
Plaintiffs further alleged that CPI’s public statements about the Phase II/III
clinical trial were materially false and misleading because they did not describe
the alleged flaws in the design of that clinical trial and were made with scienter
“because at the time of their publications, defendants knew, or recklessly disre-
garded, that [CPI] had failed to design [properly that] clinical trial.”199  Plaintiffs
also asserted that “defendants were motivated to conceal the true nature of
CPI’s clinical trials in order to maintain the market’s perception that CPI would
be the first company with an FDA-approved . . . novel investigational drug . . .
for APC,” but made no claim that CPI or any of its officers or directors sold
CPI stock during the class period.200
The facts alleged clearly do not support plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that
defendants acted “knowingly or recklessly.”  Those facts suggest, at most, that
CPI may have been negligent in designing the Phase II/III study or in recruiting
physicians to participate in it.  Moreover, other facts alleged by plaintiffs make
194. Id. ¶ 59.
195. Id. ¶¶ 60-62.
196. See id. ¶ 2.
197. Plaintiffs mention no other sources in their brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to dis-
miss.  See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 12-14,
30-32, In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1999) (No. 99-752).
198. CPI Complaint, supra note 190,  ¶ 63.
199. Id. ¶ 65(e).
200. Id. ¶ 68.
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clear that designing the clinical trial badly would not have served CPI’s inter-
ests.  Prevatac was a unique drug that CPI believed would effectively treat a
rare condition—APC.  Plaintiffs’ description of CPI, its business, and Prevatac
all suggest CPI had no reason to believe Prevatac would produce beneficial re-
sults in patients who did not suffer from APC.201  Consequently, including pa-
tients who did not have APC in the clinical trial would jeopardize, not enhance,
the prospect that the trial would produce statistically significant positive results.
The facts alleged support neither plaintiffs’ claim that defendants acted reck-
lessly when they designed the Phase II/III clinical trial nor their claim that CPI
acted with scienter when it made public statements about the clinical trial that
did not disclose the problems CPI subsequently discovered in its design.
The district court ignored these glaring weaknesses when it denied both de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss and defendants’ subsequent motion seeking recon-
sideration or certification of the case for interlocutory review.202  Only after de-
fendants filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus did the district court issue
an opinion explaining its decisions.203  The court recognized that the Reform Act
requires plaintiffs to meet more demanding pleading standards but then flouted
those requirements.  Its discussion of the Basis Requirement may best reflect its
attitude.  The court acknowledged that section (b)(1) requires plaintiffs to plead
with particularity all facts on which their claims are based but then indicated its
intent to dilute that requirement by quoting the following statements made in
pre-Reform Act cases:
Plaintiffs need not, however, plead the “date, place or time” of the fraud, so long as
they use an “alternative means of injecting precision and some measure of substantia-
tion into their allegations of fraud” . . . . [T]he Third Circuit has cautioned that courts
should “apply the rule with some flexibility and should not require plaintiffs to plead
issues that may have been concealed by the defendants.”204
The court’s central finding—that plaintiffs “have adequately alleged that
CPI acted with deliberate recklessness in pushing forward with a clinical trial
which they knew was flawed”—cannot be squared with section (b)(1) because
no facts pled by plaintiffs demonstrate that CPI was aware of the flaws in the
clinical trial at the time it made the challenged statements.205  More generally,
the court erred when it credited certain allegations plaintiffs made without re-
quiring plaintiffs to plead the facts on which they were based.206
201. See id. ¶¶ 29-32.
202. See In re Cell Pathways, No. 99-725, 2000 WL 805221, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000).
203. See id.
204. Id. at *5 (internal citations omitted).
205. Id. at *8.
206. For example, the court said that paragraph 62 of the complaint supports plaintiffs’ assertion
that
 in a conference call to stock market analysts on June 16, 1999, [a CPI official] stated that the
medical records needed to identify persons who would fall within the patient target popula-
tion, those forming ten to forty polyps per year, were not obtained and analyzed until after the
Phase III trial was concluded.
Id. at *4 n.2.  But paragraph 62 contains only one identified statement by a CPI official, to the effect
that the “trial data revealed a higher degree of variability in polyp formation by [the patients included
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A second problem is that the court apparently did not appreciate the limited
nature of some of plaintiffs’ claims.  For example, facts pled by plaintiffs argua-
bly provide support for their claim, on which the court heavily relied, that CPI
officials “had knowledge of the potential flaws in the enrollment process” at the
time CPI made the challenged statements about the Phase II/III clinical trial.207
But plaintiffs’ use of the phrase “knowledge of the potential flaws” makes clear
that they are asserting no more than that senior CPI officials presumably were
familiar with the protocols governing clinical studies and therefore should have
been aware of potential problems with the enrollment process they employed.
Such allegations fall far short of the claim the court said plaintiffs had ade-
quately alleged: that, as of February 1, 1999, CPI knew or recklessly disregarded
the fact that there were flaws in the enrollment process and knew or recklessly
disregarded that those flaws were highly likely to jeopardize the statistical in-
tegrity of the Phase II/III clinical trial.  This deficit is not remedied by the
court’s finding that plaintiffs identified “the sources for their beliefs that the
trial was flawed.”208  That plaintiffs believe the trial was flawed is unimportant;
the relevant question is whether plaintiffs alleged facts that suggest defendants
knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the trial was flawed at the time they
made the challenged statements.209
These problems are serious, but the most substantial deficit in the court’s
decision is the absence of any reasoned explanation of howeven if one as-
sumes that plaintiffs did allege some facts that suggest defendants’ actions in
designing the clinical trial may have been recklessdefendants’ alleged failure
to take note of and to disclose the potential problems with the clinical trial con-
ceivably could be viewed as involving “an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care . . . which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sell-
ers that [was] either known to the defendant[s] or [was] so obvious that the[y]
must have been aware of it.”210  In other words, even if the Cell Pathways com-
plaint somehow could be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section (b)(1),
there is no way in which the court reasonably could find that it gives rise to a
in the study] than had previously been thought by experts in this disease.”  CPI Complaint, supra note
190, at ¶ 62.  Note that the official’s statement is to the effect that CPI was surprised by the variability
in polyp formation revealed by the trial data, not that CPI did not obtain patient records until after the
Phase III trial was concluded.  If the court was relying on the added assertion in paragraph 62 that a
CPI executive “would later suggest that other factors, like an insufficient ‘degree of scrutiny’ of patient
medical records had led to inclusion of enough ineligible patients to cripple the trial,” the court should
have noticed that plaintiffs did not identify any documentary or other source for that assertion. CPI
Complaint, supra note 190, at ¶ 62.  Thus, the assertion should not have been credited.
207. Cell Pathways, 2000 WL 805221, at *7 (emphasis added).
208. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
209. Another problem with plaintiffs’ claim is that the defendants probably did not have a duty to
disclose “potential problems” with the clinical study until they knew that those problems would, in fact,
jeopardize the integrity of the study.  See In re Carter-Wallace Inc. Sec. Litig., 220 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that “statements ‘did not become materially misleading until Carter-Wallace had infor-
mation that Felbatol had caused a statistically significant number of aplastic-anemia deaths and there-
fore had reason to believe that the commercial viability of Felbatol was threatened’”).
210. See In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting McLean v. Alexander, 599
F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979)) (holding that this is the governing standard of recklessness).
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strong inference that defendants acted with the requisite degree of recklessness
when they issued the statements that plaintiffs claim were materially false or
misleading.211
One might dismiss Cell Pathways as simply a bad district court decision had
the court not noted defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus.  That gives
Cell Pathways added importance.  A decision by the Third Circuit to grant the
requested writ would have signaled that court’s determination to require plain-
tiffs to comply with the Reform Act’s stringent pleading requirements.212  The
Third Circuit’s decision not to hear defendants’ petition213 sends a more am-
biguous message.  District courts could read it as either affirming federal ap-
pellate courts’ traditional reluctance to review district court denials of motions
to dismiss or as an indication that the Third Circuit is prepared to tolerate dis-
trict court decisions that flout the requirements of the Reform Act.214
The Third Circuit was the first appellate court to consider the Reform Act’s
pleading standards at length.  The plaintiffs’ allegations in Advanta, the case in
which that court did so, were extremely weak,215 which makes it difficult to de-
termine to what extent, if any, the Third Circuit’s views of the Reform Act dif-
fer from the interpretations set forth in Silicon Graphics and Greebel.
Advanta concludes that section (b)(2) “was intended to modify procedural
requirements while leaving substantive law undisturbed.”216  As a matter of sub-
stantive law, Advanta holds, “it remains sufficient for plaintiffs to plead scienter
by alleging facts ‘establishing a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud, or
by setting forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavior.’”217  But, the court continued:
Motive and opportunity, like all other allegations of scienter (intentional, conscious,
or reckless behavior), must now be supported by facts stated “with particularity” and
must give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter.  These heightened pleading require-
ments address the previous ease of alleging motive and opportunity on the part of cor-
porate officers to commit securities fraud . . . . After the Reform Act, catch-all allega-
211. See id. at 540 (noting that the allegation that defendants disregarded negative trends, “even if
true, would not demonstrate [the] ‘extreme departure’ from the standards of ordinary care” that is nec-
essary to show scienter).
212. As of September 1, 2000, defendants’ petition had been pending before a motions panel of the
Third Circuit for more than two months.
213. On September 29, 2000, the Third Circuit issued an order denying the petition without opinion.
See In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 00-1643 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 2000).
214. The Third Circuit might well have been concerned that, had it issued the requested writ of
mandamus, it would be inundated with requests for such writs from defendants whose motions to dis-
miss securities fraud complaints were denied.  On the other hand, the Third Circuit could have limited
that risk by explaining that it was reviewing the district court’s decision in Cell Pathways only because it
provided a unique opportunity to furnish district courts with guidance on important pleading issues that
the appellate court had not previously addressed.  See infra text accompanying notes 215-220.
215. The court held that plaintiffs’ factual allegations did not support plaintiffs’ claim that defen-
dants’ challenged statements were either false or misleading.  See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 537-39.  As con-
cerned scienter, the court found that plaintiffs offered only “conclusory assertions that the defendants
acted ‘knowingly,’ [and] blanket statements that defendants must have been aware of the impending
losses by virtue of their positions within the company.”  Id. at 539 (citation omitted).
216. Id. at 534.
217. Id. at 534-35 (quoting Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 n.8 (3d Cir.1997)).
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tions that defendants stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had the opportunity to
implement a fraudulent scheme are no longer sufficient, because they do not state
facts with particularity or give rise to a strong inference of scienter.218
On the recklessness issue, the court reiterated the Third Circuit’s “previous
holding that it remains a sufficient basis for liability,” as well as the relevant
definition of recklessness set forth in Sunstrand.219
These statements suggest that the Third Circuit intends to interpret the Re-
form Act in much the same fashion as have the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, except insofar as Advanta’s discussion of motive and opportunity may
suggest a slightly lower pleading threshold than those courts have adopted.
Plaintiffs in Cell Pathways did not allege, and the district court did not find, mo-
tive and opportunity, so a decision on the merits by the Third Circuit in Cell
Pathways would not have clarified whether it takes a different view of those fac-
tors than do the other circuits.  But Cell Pathways could have provided the
Third Circuit with an excellent vehicle to elaborate on the need for plaintiffs to




This article applauds the manner in which the First and Ninth Circuits have
interpreted the Reform Act’s pleading requirements and urges other courts to
adopt similarly stringent interpretations of sections (b)(1) and (b)(2).  It takes
that position because plaintiffs’ attorneys, prior to the passage of the Reform
Act, regularly used “the litigation process as a device for extracting undeserved
settlements as the price of avoiding the extensive discovery costs that frequently
ensue once a complaint survives dismissal.”221  Requiring plaintiffs to meet more
stringent pleading standards is a viable—and perhaps the best—strategy for
dealing with that problem.
Some surely will argue that the Reform Act, as interpreted in Silicon
Graphics and Greebel, shortchanges society’s “interest in deterring fraud in the
securities markets and remedying it when it occurs,”222 which can be protected
only by providing investors who believe they are the victims of fraud with an
opportunity to conduct discovery of those they suspect of having perpetrated
the fraud.223  Viewed in a void, this argument no doubt has merit.  Cases surely
218. Id. at 535 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
219. Id.
220. The court assumed, arguendo, that plaintiffs’ allegations were true and held that “[e]ven if the
positive portrayals were materially misleading, we believe the complaint suffers a more fundamental
defect in that it fails to satisfy the Reform Act’s requirements for pleading scienter.”  Id. at 539.
221. In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Elkind, supra note
31.
222. Id.
223. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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will arise in which, as a consequence of the Reform Act’s pleading standards,
frauds will go unremedied.224
But that is beside the point. As Judge Newman recognized years ago, any
pleading standard, no matter how drafted, will result in some frauds going un-
remedied and some undeserved settlements being extracted.225  The relevant in-
quiry, from a policy point of view,226 is whether the Reform Act, as interpreted
in Silicon Graphics and Greebel, gets the balance right.
The short answer is that it is far too early to tell.  Little more than a year has
passed since the first group of appellate decisions interpreting sections (b)(1)
and (b)(2) were handed down.  Prior to that time, district courts had adopted a
variety of different interpretations of the Basis and Strong Inference Require-
ments.  Many plaintiffs’ attorneys no doubt followed what they viewed as an
economically rational strategy:  Where publicly available information suggested
a fraud may have occurred, they incurred as little in the way of investigation
costs as possible in the hope that the court would interpret the Reform Act in a
fashion that would allow them to use discovery to search for evidence of
fraud.227  Moreover, uncertainty remains as to whether a number of circuits—in-
cluding the Second and the Third—will interpret the Basis and Strong Inference
Requirements as do Silicon Graphics and Greebel.
As a consequence, it probably will be many years before researchers have
enough data to determine with any degree of confidence whether the costs gen-
erated by the Reform Act, measured in terms of unremedied frauds, outweigh
the benefits.  One possibility is that if courts uniformly begin to demand more
of plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ attorneys will become more skilled at ferreting out evi-
dence of fraud or explaining how available facts support a strong inference that
a fraud occurred.228  Nonetheless, situations surely will arise where the facts
available to potential plaintiffs will stimulate strong suspicions that a fraud has
occurred but will not support a complaint that meets the requirements of sec-
tions (b)(1) and (b)(2).229  I have argued elsewhere that courts could allow a
224. Cf. In re Green Tree Fin. Corp. Stock Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1999); Weiss & Mo-
ser, supra note 16.
225. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996).
226. From what might be termed a legal point of view, it seems clear that the language and, to the
extent it is relevant, the legislative history of sections (b)(1) and (b)(2) provide substantial support for
the manner in which Silicon Graphics, Greebel, Comshare and Avado interpret those provisions.  And,
“[i]f Congress erred, . . . it is for that body, and not [the courts], to correct its mistake.”  Reves v. Ernst
& Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990).
227. In Cell Pathways, for example, after the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
made 92 document requests that, taken together, called for “the production of virtually every docu-
ment in Defendants’ possession.”  CPI Petition, supra note 190, at 8.
228. See, e.g., Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000), discussed supra note 187.
229. But see Weiss & Moser, supra note 16, at 460, noting that three important categories of cases
are largely unaffected by the Reform Act’s pleading requirements:
(i) cases where the “bad news” statement that precipitates a claim also makes it clear that
some earlier statement made by defendants was false or misleading, as is often the case when
a corporation restates its earnings for some earlier period; (ii) cases where, in connection with
the “bad news” statement, some third party discloses information that indicates that one or
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plaintiff to rely on the “undue prejudice” exception to the Reform Act’s discov-
ery stay to take limited discovery, provided she is
able to show that defendants control information critical to her claim and also [can] (i)
plead particularized facts sufficient to make out most elements of a claim of securities
fraud; (ii) show that she has made a diligent effort to obtain the remaining information
necessary to flesh out her claim; and (iii) convince the court that she has reasonable
grounds to believe that particularized discovery will produce that information.230
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus reversing a district
court decision allowing a plaintiff to take limited discovery where the district
court found she had met somewhat similar conditions. 231  The appellate court
reasoned that to allow a plaintiff to take discovery in such circumstances would
contravene Congress’s clear intent “that complaints in these securities actions
should stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than
information produced by the defendants after the action has been filed.”232
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning seems flawed.  Congress expressly provided
that a plaintiff should be allowed to conduct discovery where she could show
“undue prejudice”233 and never discussed what was meant by that term.234  In ad-
dition, the case on which the Ninth Circuit relied dealt with quite a different is-
sue: whether, in a district whose rules provide for “disclosure,” plaintiffs in
cases involving allegations of securities fraud routinely should be allowed to
compel defendants to make disclosure before the court ruled on defendants’
motion to dismiss.235
The Ninth Circuit, however, may well have been influenced by more prag-
matic concerns.  In proposing the above interpretation of the undue prejudice
exception to the discovery stay, I recognized the danger that if courts were to
begin to allow discovery if the specified conditions were met, every plaintiff
who found she could not develop sufficient facts to allow her to draft a com-
plaint that would survive a motion to dismiss would be tempted to claim “undue
prejudice.”236  Given the persistence with which some plaintiffs’ attorneys have
continued to attempt to base claims of securities fraud on “boilerplate allega-
tions,”237 the court might well have feared that a decision that allowed plaintiffs,
more of a corporation’s earlier statements were false or misleading; and (iii) cases where the
temporal proximity between the “bad news” statement and the “earlier, cheerier” statement,
combined with the magnitude of the changes between the two, strongly suggests that a corpo-
ration was aware of the bad news at the time it made the earlier statement.
(footnotes omitted.)
230. Weiss & Moser, supra note 16, at 506.
231. See SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 189 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1999).  But cf. In
re Flir Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 00-360-HA, 2000 WL 33201904 (D. Ore. Dec. 13, 2000) (allowing
plaintiff to depose third party who defendant had threatened to sue if he volunteered information to
plaintiff).
232. Id. at 912 (quoting Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir.1996)).
233. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1998).
234. See Weiss & Moser, supra note 16, at 501.
235. See Medhekar, 99 F.3d at 326.
236. See Weiss & Moser, supra note 16, at 506.
237. See sources cited supra note 55.
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even in sharply defined circumstances, to plead “undue prejudice” would result
in such a claim being made in virtually every case in which a district court
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Regardless, with or without the possibility of limited discovery, it will be
many years before anyone can demonstrate with any degree of certainty
whether or not the Reform Act’s pleading provisions serve society’s interests
better than did the notice pleading regime that preceded them.
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APPENDIX
As noted in the text, an attorney experienced in prosecuting class actions
alleging securities fraud will appreciate that plaintiffs must show not only that
they incurred losses, but that (1) some earlier statement or statements made by
or on behalf of the potential defendant (“Defendant”) were materially false or
misleading at the time they were made—falsity — (2) that Defendant or one or
more of its senior officials issued the earlier statements with an intent to de-
ceive or defraud—scienter—and (3) that the earlier statements inflated the
market price of Defendant’s stock and thus contributed to or caused the losses
investors have incurred—causation.A1
To satisfy the falsity requirement, plaintiffs must specify why Defendant’s
“earlier, cheerier” statements were false or misleading at the time they were
made.  Under the Reform Act, plaintiffs also must plead with particularity facts
sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that the “earlier, cheerier” state-
ments were issued with an intent to deceive or defraud.
In most such situations, plaintiffs’ attorney will not know precisely what in-
formation, if any, relating to the subsequently announced bad news was avail-
able to Defendant and its senior officers at the time the earlier statements were
made, nor will it be easy for plaintiffs’ attorney to ascertain whether Defendant
or its senior officers were aware of or deliberately ignored any such informa-
tion.  However, plaintiffs’ attorney usually will find it easy to identify some ear-
lier statements by Defendant or its senior officers that discuss the subject to
which the unanticipated “bad news” relates.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys then can use
the facts disclosed in Defendant’s “bad news” statement and facts available
from other public sources to draft allegations that reflect no more than specula-
tion or conjecture but that appear to set forth particularized facts, which, if
credited, virtually compel the conclusion that Defendant knew its “earlier
cheerier” statements were materially false or misleading at the time they were
made.
The following examples illustrate this practice.
A. Declining SalesA2
Acme Corporation, a manufacturer of electronic widgets, has reported
quarter-to-quarter increases in sales and profits for thirty consecutive quarters.
Following the third quarter of the current year, Acme announces unexpected
bad news:  Its sales for the quarter were flat, as compared to the previous quar-
A1. If Defendant corporation’s stock is traded in an efficient market, such as the New York Stock
Exchange or NASDAQ, a court will presume that a materially false or misleading public statement
made by or on behalf of Defendant corporation influenced the price of its stock.  See Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
A2. This illustration is based in large part on the court’s discussion of plaintiff’s complaint in Coo-
per v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 626 (9th Cir. 1998).
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ter, and its profits declined.A3  The price of Acme’s stock drops by more than
fifty percent following this announcement.  Plaintiff’s attorney L does a quick
analysis of Acme’s business and history and concludes that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that Acme’s sales and earnings began to flatten out prior to
the third quarter.  L also estimates how much Acme’s sales and earnings would
have been in each of the prior two quarters had its decline followed what L con-
siders to be a more normal trajectory.  Finally, L ascertains from Acme’s filings
with the SEC and other public sources that Acme’s four largest customers are
WW, XX, YY, and ZZ.
With this information in hand, L (after having been retained by one or more
recent purchasers of Acme stock) files a class action, on behalf of all persons
who purchased Acme stock subsequent to Acme’s announcement of its earn-
ings for the first quarter, alleging that Acme’s management has been aware for
at least six months of a decline in Acme’s sales and that, in an effort to mislead
investors, Acme knowingly issued financial statements for the first and second
quarters that included materially inflated statements of Acme’s revenues and
income.  L supports these claims by including in the complaint the following
“particularized” allegations:
In each of the first and second quarters, Acme deliberately shipped ex-
cessive amounts of widgets to its largest customers.  In many instances,
Acme promised these customers that they would not have to pay for
the widgets unless and until they re-sold them.  In other instances,
Acme actually shipped merchandise that had not been ordered by the
customer.  These customers included WW, XX, YY, and ZZ.
Generally accepted accounting principles required Acme to defer reve-
nue recognition of income with respect to these shipments until pay-
ment was received, but Acme instead reported these shipments as sales
in order to overstate its revenues and net income.  This resulted in
Acme overstating its revenues, net income, and earnings per share for
the first and second quarters in material dollar amounts that L derives
by estimating, in consultation with an expert accountant, what Acme’s
revenues, net income, and earnings per share would have been had
Acme’s sales declined in accord with L’s estimate.
B. Failed ExpansionA4
Baker Corporation announces on April 2 of the current year that its earn-
ings declined in the first quarter from first quarter earnings for the previous
year—the first year-to-year decline in Baker’s history.  Baker also states that
A3. A similar scenario arises where a company announces that its sales failed to increase as rapidly
as the market had anticipated.
A4. This illustration is based in large part on the court’s discussion of plaintiff’s complaint in Fecht
v.The Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1083 nn.5, 6 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the decline was due, in large part, to disappointing sales and resultant losses at
several stores that Baker recently had opened.  Following this announcement,
the price of Baker stock declines by thirty percent.  Attorney L ascertains that
during the past nine months Baker had made several positive statements about
its expansion program.  The most recent of these was issued on January 16
when a Baker press release stated that Baker’s expansion program “was going
well” and that most of Baker’s recently opened stores were “quite successful.”
L also ascertains from Baker’s most recent Form 10-K that during the previous
eighteen months, Baker opened new stores in WW, XX, YY and ZZ.  Finally,
in early June, L learns from a Baker press release that Baker has decided to
close its new stores in YY and ZZ.
L concludes that Baker must have been aware of problems at some of its
new stores before it issued the January 16 statement, given that problems
probably were evident at the end of the fourth quarter, in which Baker’s stores
typically generate more than fifty percent of their sales, and that Baker proba-
bly was aware of problems at some of those stores by July 15 of the previous
year, when Baker also issued positive comments about its expansion program.
Based on these beliefs, L (after having been retained by an investor who pur-
chased Baker stock between July 15 of the previous year and April 2) files a
class action, on behalf of all persons who purchased Baker stock between July
15 and April 2, alleging that as of or prior to July 15, Baker’s management was
aware of developing problems at its four new stores and that, in an effort to
mislead investors, Baker deliberately issued materially false and misleading
statements concerning its expansion program.  To support this claim, L includes
in the complaint an allegation that five senior mangers of Baker, all of whom L
names as defendants, received weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports that in-
cluded information on the sales and profitability of each of Baker’s stores and
the following “particularized” allegations:
During the period beginning eighteen months before April 2 and end-
ing the previous April 2, Baker opened new stores in WW, XX, YY,
and ZZ.  Initial sales volumes of these newly opened stores were below
levels usually experienced by Baker at newly opened stores and below
levels necessary for the stores to achieve profitable operations.  Recent
store openings in WW, XX, YY, and ZZ were proceeding poorly and
most of these units were losing money.  At least for the near term,
Baker faced a major threat of eroding profits and declining margins be-
cause of the size of the losses being suffered at Baker’s newly opened
stores, especially in YY and ZZ.  Baker’s new stores in YY and ZZ
were performing very poorly and suffering significant losses that were
adversely affecting Price Company’s overall results.
Prior to the beginning of the class period and throughout the class pe-
riod, the defendant senior managers of Baker received weekly,
monthly, and quarterly reports advising each of them of the disap-
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pointing sales and losses incurred at the stores in WW, XX, YY, and
ZZ.  Prior to January 16, those managers also knew, or recklessly disre-
garded the fact, that the losses Baker was incurring at its stores in YY
and ZZ were so large that it was apparent Baker would have to close
those stores.
C. Accounting IrregularitiesA5
Charlie Corporation licenses software.  For a number of years, it has re-
ported steadily rising revenues and earnings.  On August 6, Charlie issues a
press release disclosing that it is delaying release of its results for the year end-
ing June 30 pending completion of its year-end audit.  Charlie further discloses
that it has expanded its audit to include a detailed review of orders generated
by its United Kingdom subsidiary in the United Kingdom and other foreign
countries after discovering letters setting forth conditions to approximately $4
million in orders of which Charlie was not aware when it recognized revenues
from those orders.  Following this disclosure, the price of Charlie stock drops
from $18.50 to $11.875.
One month later, Charlie issues its Form 10-K for the fiscal year, in which it
discloses that in the course of the year-end audit, it discovered side letters is-
sued by personnel at Charlie’s U.K. subsidiary that set “forth conditions to cer-
tain foreign orders in violation of the Company’s revenue recognition poli-
cies.”A6  These letters related to approximately $6.9 million in revenues that
Charlie improperly recognized, some of which had been recognized in “prior
quarters and years.”A7  The Form 10-K also reports that Charlie’s fourth quarter
revenue, as reported, was about seven percent below that in the previous year,
that Charlie’s total revenue for the year increased 9.8%, but that Charlie in-
curred a pre-tax loss of $13.7 million for the year, as compared to a pre-tax
profit of $2.1 million in the prior year.  The Form 10-K further states that Char-
lie was not restating any prior period results, that Charlie found no violations of
its revenue recognition policies in connection with U.S orders, and that Charlie
has taken “corrective actions . . . including management changes, personnel
terminations and other disciplinary actions and the establishment of new orders
procedures.”A8
Attorney L checks Charlie’s filings with the SEC and ascertains that Char-
lie’s chief executive officer sold about $2.5 million in Charlie stock during the
A5. This illustration is based in part on plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint,
Dec. 13, 1996, In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1997)
(No. 96-73711) and in part on allegations that plaintiffs asserted they would make if they were granted
leave to amend that complaint.  See Appellants Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc, In re
Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-2098).  That complaint and those allega-
tions were the focus of the court’s decision in Comshare.
A6. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, at 86, Dec. 13, 1996, In re Comshare Inc. Sec.
Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1997) (No. 96-73711).
A7. Id.
A8. Id.
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year prior to the August 6 announcement and that three other Charlie execu-
tives sold a total of about $1.8 million in Charlie stock during the same period.
The last of these sales, however, occurred almost two months before the August
6 announcement.  L also meets with an accounting expert and is advised that
when contingent sales occur, a company’s accounts receivable usually build-up
somewhat more rapidly than do its revenues because no payments will be re-
ceived with respect to the contingent sales until the contingencies have been
satisfied.  A variety of financial reports usually will reflect this buildup in ac-
counts receivable.
Based on this information, L (after having been retained by an investor who
recently purchased Charlie stock) files a class action on behalf of all persons
who purchased Charlie stock between the date Charlie issued its financial re-
sults for the prior year and August 6.  The complaint names as defendants
Charlie and the four executives who sold Charlie stock, details the sales of
Charlie stock by those defendants, and alleges that Charlie and those defen-
dants were parties to a scheme to falsify Charlie’s revenues and profits during
the class period.  The complaint further alleges:
Throughout the Class Period, defendants entered into and were parties
to a scheme falsely to inflate Charlie’s reported annual and quarterly
revenues and profits by agreeing that certain conditions would be in-
cluded in side letters with certain customers who had ordered software
licenses from Charlie.  In furtherance of this scheme, Defendants re-
ported the revenues, and hence the profits, from these licenses despite
that fact that, because of the conditions in the side letters, recognizing
those revenues was a violation of both Charlie’s revenue recognition
policies and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Charlie and the individual defendants were aware of the side letters or
were recklessly indifferent to “red flags” indicating that the side letters
had been issued and that revenues from substantial amounts of contin-
gent sales had improperly been recognized.  In particular:
(A) Charlie and the individual defendants received monthly and
quarterly reports that disclosed increasing accounts receivable
resulting from the phony sales over time.
(B) Charlie and the individual defendants received and monitored
payment schedules from Charlie’s accounts receivable so that
they could estimate the amount and timing of cash collections
and also received accounts receivable aging schedules to assess
the necessary level of reserves for uncollectible accounts.
These reports disclosed that the accounts receivable from the
phony sales were delinquent for extended periods of time and
were not being collected.
